Ben,
Crews flying at low level under VFR are not obliged to make radio calls to ATC unless requiring to penetrate controlled airspace. I did not intend to infer that they should not have made such a call, or that it was imperative that it was answered. What I hoped to make clear was that it was probably not a major surprise at the time for no reply to be received to a routine call made from low level. Comms at low level are often sporadic due to terrain masking. An aircraft in distress would certainly make a call, but during an inadvertant entry into IMC (if this did in fact happen) a call would no doubt be made at the appropriate time, in order to obtain a radar service or whatever assistance was required by the Captain. The immediate priority and a pilot's gut instinct would normally be to climb as rapidly as possible and / or turn away from relevant obstructions. It is possible the crew had a problem, there were two pieces of evidence to suggest this, namely the transponder setting, which had been changed to include a "7" (7700=Mayday) and the co-pilot's intercom, which was found in the emergency position, as if the normal system had failed. It is possible that a lack of intercom at a critical time was a factor, but this will never be known.
The last person to see the aircraft in flight was the yachtsman, who said that the aircraft was flying slowly enough for him to think it might be involved in a SAR, as if searching the surface of the sea. What none of us can understand is how the aircraft went from low speed in VMC to very high speed, in a climb, towards high ground, probably then in IMC. It makes absolutely NO sense for a crew to normally do this, normally speed is converted to height.
However, an engine runaway up would require the pilot's full attention and very rapid intervention. To contain the rotor RPM within structural limits, a great deal of collective pitch needs to be applied without a second's delay. This WOULD result in a rapid acceleration. A pilot's initial reaction would be to try to keep the aircraft in VMC, especially so in this case, without an icing clearance, but in marginal VMC conditions that could prove impossible.
I am NOT saying I believe this occurred, no-one ever has, but it is just as likely a scenario as any other supposition. It is known for FADEC problems to occur in flight (not only on this aircraft type) and subsequently leave no evidence once electrical power has been removed from the aircraft. I understand some engine runaways had already occurred on the MK2 and one aircraft in the USA had been severely damaged on the ground. It is now known that MOD were suing Boeing because the FADEC software was of dubious integrity. To complicate the issue, it had been written in an obsolescent programming language, which made changes extremely difficult. This latter fact was not revealed by MOD until well after the BOI (and well after the crew had been deemed Grossly Negligent).
K52,
My recollection is that during the HOL inquiry, Sqn Ldr Bob Burke, the RAF Odiham UTP, stated that he was detailed to bring the aircraft back to Odiham for maintenance because at that time no-one at Boscombe was prepared to fly the type again, even for 10 minutes to Odiham, until uncertainties about the engine software were resolved.
I have NO wish to re-convene the BOI. There is no need, in my opinion. That isn't why this thread is here.
The RAF's Board of Inquiry found that there was not sufficient evidence to determine the cause. The original findings (verdict) of the BOI, as convened by the RAF, consisted of Chinook pilots and other very experienced Support Helicopter pilots, were not accepted and overturned by two officers higher up the chain of command. Without firm evidence and without further investigation, the pilots were deemed to be Grossly Negligent.
This was against the RAF's normal procedure, as the officers concerned had perished in the accident and could not defend themselves against the allegation.
One of those two officers, when asked to explain his reason for disregarding the findings of the BOI, arrogantly retorted that the President of the BOI (who was a Wing Commander Chinook pilot of some 19 years service and well experienced in the NI theatre) was "a relatively inexperienced pilot and officer" or words to that effect. One can only wonder why he was promoted at all in that case (actually I know Wg Cdr Pulford of old, in no way could he be described as such, he was well respected and undoubtedly still is).
I have seen, read or heard nothing to change my original viewpoint that this crew, or any other, should not have been found guilty of manslaughter in the absence of actual EVIDENCE to prove it.
I remain convinced that this sorry affair was motivated by a political desire to divert attention away from the flawed decision to put this suspect type of aircraft into service BEFORE it was proved airworthy, as required by the normal RAF and MOD prodedure. Who made that decision has never been revealed.
Any amount of supposition, theorising or pontificating cannot compensate for lack of EVIDENCE. I think Brian Dixon will confirm that he placed the thread not so much to determine the cause but to fight against the unjust placing of the blame.
No apology offered for reiterating this yet again.
Last edited by ShyTorque; 13th Apr 2004 at 20:43.