This team as a whole was the one at the coal face, with irreplaceable qualities and experience - the loss was severe. Even the popular press at the time questioned why so important a team was all on one helicopter.
In terms of influence on govt policy, who can block it?
The point is that they could have objected strongly and been a great embarrassment to the govt, they knowing what was and was not possible better than the politicians - and their counsel during negotiations would have been invaluable (to one side at least).
And points 1 & 2 still stand.
Thus I find it strange that sabotage was so lightly dismissed so early by the authorities.
There may well have been no skulduggery on any parties part in this tragedy, but it appears to me that fear of contemplating such is blocking people's minds to objectively determining what actually happened - all I am asking on this thread is that anyone with particular knowledge of this flight confirm the usual flight plan and contingencies and clear up the actual navigation practice in such conditions - and help explain some anomalies (eg the incomplete sequence of radio calls, for example). I am surprised that such basic considerations were not the starting point in the inquiries - the vigour put into distractions and the appalling obfuscation at the inquiries only suggests that there may be something the govt or RAF does not want made public.
Let me put my perspective as simply as I can:
The best analysis I have seen on the flight suggests that the a/c was basically flying straight and level at a high cruise speed, showing no signs of control problems until a vigorous evasive manoeuvre was executed shortly before impact, and controls were as expected to have got the a/c to the attitude that it was in at impact – ie the a/c was under control.
Seems to me that they were closer than they thought and thus navigation should have been the primary issue.
So, after 9 years of exhaustive debate on everything else, let us spend a short time on navigation and put it to bed:
Let us determine, from those who would know, what exactly was the intended path of this flight.
In regard to the frequently occurring localised mist on the Mull, was there any special practice to allow routine flights to continue at low level in close proximity to the Mull?
Were there any special conditions (eg security concerns) that would allow such routine flights to change their status and modify their flight plans (eg go in real close to the headland to mask approach, using such and such prearranged procedure and equipment)? And who would make the decision to apply them.
Let us ask for the complete radio recordings, or a statement from the airspace controller involved explaining the unanswered call, or if it was answered but the recordings withheld let us ask why so and what was said (eg was anything said that could have caused the a/c to something non routine).
That’s it – all it would take to close this aspect. Just to finish off, here is my theory as to what happened:
The intention was to approach the Mull at low level and close in turn up (at waypoint A as referred to in the inquiries) the coast towards Macrihanish (as was common practice for these flights).
They were in control at waypoint A or they would not have been bothering to update their enroute nav (TANS) with a distant waypoint.
Under the prevailing conditions of a ground hugging mist obscuring detail on the Mull, waypoint A was already too close in to safely rely on the Mk1 eyeball for distance off the Mull for starting a safe turn at their high closing speed – and don’t forget that this crew had little faith in the accuracy of the TANS anyway – and yet they carried on.
The only thing that such an experienced and responsible crew would have trusted in to go in so close in such conditions was the good old reliable and accurate TACAN – being just about ahead of them, the Distance Measuring (DME) function would have been an ideal countdown for their turn (don’t forget, they were in clear air until the last moment – it was the judgement of distance off the misty Mull that was the problem – VFR was OK so long as they stayed clear of the localised mist – what a ****** to have to consider IMC for just this one point on the route! – how many times would flight crews on this “milk run” have debated this point?).
ZD576’s TACAN CU was set to ch 107 (Macrihanish DME). They were not supposed to be landing at the aerodrome and had the TANS for en route nav.
Now, readers, what do you think they had that set for?
And it is very, very easy to alter the internal delay in the DME on the ground to give a false reading of, say, 1 mile.
Never mind the detractors, what was the practice on these runs according to the other pilots who made them?