AA587 F/O Sten Molin Had Kicked Rudder Before...
From NTSB File:
"Person Interviewed: John Francis LaVelle
Position: Captain, B-737, American Airlines,
Represented By: Mr. Ray Duke, Attorney Allied Pilots Association
Date and Time: July 15,2002,0915.EDT
Present: Operations Group members David Ivey, Bart Elias, James Goachee, Delvin
Young, John Lauer
. Location: Telephonehtewiew ,
Captain LaVelle stated that his date of birth was May 21,1960 and that American
Airlines hired him on October 28,1986. He estimated his total flying time to be about
14,000 hours and currently was a captain on the B-737. Positions he had held since being
. hired by American included flight engineer B-727, first officer MD-80, first officer B-
757/767, first officer MD-11 , captain E727 and current was a captain and check aiman
on the B-737. Captain LaVelle estimated his flying times to be about 1,700 hours on the
B-727 while flying as captain, and about 1,200 hours as captain on the B-737.
He stated he had met Ed States, the captain, and stated that they had met in
operations a few times. He only had casual conversations with him.
He knew Sten Molin, the first officer. They had flown together on a number of
occasions on the B-727. When they first met, Captain LaVelle was a junior captain and
Sten Molin was a junior first officer. Both were on reserve in the New York base.
He described Mr. Molin’s personality as that of a perfectionist who worked hard
and did everything by the book. He was a real gentleman as well. He said the first met in
May 1997, and the last time he saw Sten Molin was sometime in the summer of 2001 in
operations. He was just as he always was; a nice person and Captain LaVelle enjoyed his
company.
Captain LaVelle said he flew two or three trips with Mr. Molin over a 12 month
period. He stated that Mr. Molin’s flying skills were excellent. He had excellent flying
ability, however, he had one strange tendency: to be very agressive on the rudder pedals.
Captain LaVelle stated that during a climb out in a B-727, while the airplane was “dirty
of with flaps 5 degrees”, Mr. Molin stroked the rudder pedals “1-2-3, about that fast.”
Captain LaVelle thought they had lost an engine. Captain LaVelle asked him what he
was doing, and Mr. Molin said he was leveling wings due to wake turbulence. Captain
LaVelle stated that Mr. Molin never leveled the wings, and his actions just created
yawing moments on the airplane. M e r they cleaned up the airplane they discussed it
M e r . Mr. Moli told him he was leveling the wings as per the M. Captain
LaVelle told him it was quite aggressive, and that it didn’t really level the wings. They
talked about the AAMP, Mi. Molin insisted that AAMP (Advanced Aircraft
Maneuvering Program) gave him directions to use rudder pedals in that fishion. Captain
LaVelle disagreed, and said he thought the use of rudder was, according to AAMP, for
use at lower airspeeds.’ He disputed Mr. Molin and told him to be less aggressive and
more coordinated using rudder.
- . ..
Captain LaVelle said that on two subsequent occasions Mr. Molin modified his
wake turbulence manuever to comply with his wishes. Mr. Molin used rudder during
these encounters but did not go to the full stop. He was still very quick.
During this first wake turbulence encounter, Captain LaVelle stated that it did not
require any more than aileron to level the wings. Occasion (wake encounter) was nothing
more than needing a little aileron to level the wings. Captain LaVelle thought that Mr.
Molin was more aggressive than he needed to be. He said the B-727 was very a very
stable airplane. He did not have to be that aggressive.
He recalled the fist encounter to be during the “clean up” [ d e r departure] on the
B-727. The altitude was between 1,000 and 1,500 feet. It was somewhere around this
altitude range that the event occurred. He believed Mr. Molin that the rudder was pushed
to fill stops. He said the effect on B-727 was that it created an uncomfortable yaw to the
“left- right- left”. There were heavy side-loads. He said he thought they went to left first,
but was not sure. Mr. Molin stopped using the rudder on his own. Captain LaVelle
thought they had an engine problem so his attention was drawn to the engine instruments.
When asked, he said he did not think Mr. Molin made any aileron inputs during the
encounter. The rudder never leveled the wings. He did not recall the wings moving, but
experienced, “sideload, sideload, sideload”.
.
His experience has been that you have to hold rudder in to get wing leveling fi-om
rudder. The AAMP program was brought up by Mr. Molii in their conversation after the
event. He was adamant that he was complying with AAMP. Captain LaVelle requested
that Mr. Molin review the AAMP program when he got home, and to be less aggressive
when he flew with him. It never came up in conversation again. This was first time he
flew with him. Months later, when they flew together, they encountered wake turbulence
on two separate occasions with him again. During the subsequent times they flew
together, the subject did not come up again in conversation ifMr. Molin had reviewed the
AAMP.
Captain LaVelle knew Mr. Molin had a civilian background and had been a
commuter pilot. He was proud that his dad had been an Eastem Airlines pilot. He told
Captain LaVelle that his father had taught him to fly when he was very young.
Regarding the AAMP program, Captain LaVelle thought he went through it once
in 1995 or 1996. He said he was a first officer on the B-767 at the time. He stated there
was AAMP training in the simulator, Once every checkride there is some kind of
airplane upset training received in the simulator.
had “hands of silk.” He could grease the Bi727 on landings and had good systems
knowledge.
Captain LaVelle when asked, had no recollection of what type of airplane they
were following during the first wake turbulence encounter.
Captain LaVelle stated that he was a C-130 pilot in the United States Air Force
Reserves. On one occasion, he was the last airplane in a 12-ship formation and
experienced wake turbulence. He had some very remarkable full aileron deflection with
full-scde rudder deflection, yet still rolled in the opposite direction. It was not until the
C-130 got out of the vortex that the airplane began to respond to control inputs. He went
to about 60 degrees of bank and was at an altitude of 300 feet during low-level operations
when the upset occurred. Once or twice while flying the MD-80 did he encounter wake
turbulence and he may have hit a control stop with ailerons. He was behind a B-757 on
one occasion. He used aileron only and leveled the wings. It was on an approach to a
domestic airport.
Captain LaVelle said the first event involving Mr. Molin happened about May
1997. The subsequent two wake turbulence encounters were separated by a few months;
perhaps in September 1997 and December 1997. He said that when he is the non-flying
pilot, he follows along on the rudder pedals. He felt Mr. Molin’s inputs on the rudder
pedals during that first wake turbulence event. He said it is typical for him to fly with his
feet on the pedals at critical times when the copilot is flying. He did not know what other
captains did with their feet while flying.
When asked why he remembered the event with such clarity five years later,
Captain LaVeIle stated that it was ti very aggressive maneuver and he had never seen any
other pilot do this but Mr. Molin. When questioned-about the initial direction of the yaw,
Captain LaVelle said he thought it was the left rudder input first but it could have been
the right. He said the wake vortex encounter with Mi. Molin was not much of anything.
Maybe just some choppy air. He thought that Mr. Molin may have been responding to
the choppy air. The ailerons were kept level and he used just the rudder pedals.
He stated that he was not a chkk airman at the time of the encounter. He did not
become a check airman until he became a B-737 captain.
He said he did not document or inform anyone at American Airlines, regarding
the event.
The two or three events did not seem very significant. Usually he did not
encounter wake turbulence very often. Perhaps once every quarter. Captain LaVelle
said he flew with Mi. Molin three times. Three separate trips and both of them were on
reserve status. He did not recall how many legs they flew together.
During the second and third enkounters Mr. Molin applied rudder with
During the first event, he stated he did not think Mr. Molin applied any aileron.
coordinated aileron and it was not aggressive.
Maybe a little, but it was full or close to full rudder deflection. He did not believe it was
the first leg of the first trip together in which‘the turbulence encounter happened. It was
probably the second or third time that Mr. Molin was at a e controls. It startled him
because Mr. Molin had been so smooth on the controls.
Captain LaVelle stated the wake turbulence encounter could have been due to
thermal activities or a preceding airplane. He did not think they were following a heavy
airplane. He did not recall aggressive movements or abnormal rudder inputs fiom Mr.
Molin during approaches or during the last two or three times they flew together.
When asked if he had ever made any accidental inputs to the rudder pedals while he
feet were on the pedals, Captain LaVelIe answered in the negative.
Captain LaVelle’s concluding thoughts were that he considered Mr. Molin a fiiend.
He was a great guy. He was a great pilot in all aspects except the one quirk; his use of
the rudder pedals. When asked why he had waited until now to disclose this event with
the accident first officer, he stated that he believed the NTSB was more interested in
interviewing pilots that flew the A300 and had more recent experience flyihg with the
accident crew. He said he had thought about his prior event when he heard that a wake
turbulence encounter with the accident airplane might have been a factor in the accident..."