both the captain and myself had the same sixth sense feeling at the start of the take off roll that the acceleration wasn't what we expected for a max thrust take off
That report comes from a colleague who related the tale to me long ago over coffee. Rather hear about it than watch it from the jump seat, methinks.
There have been monitoring systems available in the past. Several bits and pieces at random may provide interest reading to some eg
20080005969.pdf
Takeoff Surveillance & Monitoring Functions – Safety First (I have no AB background so can only take the linked material as read)
1499066060199533181-06175315
content
18pos11-take-off-performance-monitoring-system.pdf
How to make takeoff safer | Airbus
NPA 2025-01 (A)
In the distant past, we used speed/time against distance gone (or similar) data (using runway board style information during the takeoff). Easy enough to figure out such data if not superbly precise out on the line. It provided a useful bit of comfort (that things were progressing reasonably according to Hoyle) or discomfort (should things be heading grossly south) and gave the Commander a bit more information for decision processing assessment.
As always, the real problems are risk and risk/benefit analyses. Not much point in having such information unless the overall accuracy/reliability gives us a benefit when compared to the risk of excessive instances of nuisance warnings leading to grossly excessive reject rates.