I'm glad there's a topic like this, where pilots and engineers can have an in-depth dialogue about a specific issue. As a cockpit engineer and works in human factors, I think a typical scenario for switch-operation errors is the separation between mind and hands. My English is not good, and I don't know if there is an idiom in English that precisely captures this idea; broadly speaking, it means the mind's intention is separated from what the hands actually do.
In my view, it can be called a separation between the designer's mental flow and the operator's mental flow.
As designers, when we configure cockpit switches, we use the engineer's mental flow. As a non-native English speaker, I can't grasp the imagery English has for the word of “switch”, so I can only construct this mental-flow process using my native language.
When we consider switches, we usually think from two types of imagery. One is based on the mechanical structural characteristics of the switch, for example whether it is moved or pressed. The other is described by its volume, that is, its sense of space. Chinese as a language has very rich expressive imagery, and, as is well known, each Chinese character carries an independent meaning and does not require multisyllabic way, which determines the neatness of Chinese expression. Based on these features of Chinese, we can very easily define switches in a highly precise way.
In the operational side, we need to rename these switches so pilots can reorient them by operational semantics — for example, if a switch's function is to turn something on and off, redefine that switch as a "switch," regardless of its structure or size. If it is used for electrical control, rename it as an "electrical level." The purpose of this is to align the engineers' design flow with the pilots' operational flow. Whether called a switch (on-off) or an electrical gate(high-low), in Chinese they are two completely interchangeable syllables; this change will not produce substantive effects from design documents to training materials — for example, the length and timing of standard callouts will not change.
Furthermore, in this sense we often encourage pilots to develop their own colloquial names for these switches; we regularly evaluate those slang terms and promptly feed them back into development and training. The aim is to ensure that the operational characteristics of these switches are genuinely integrated into the pilots' operational flow, minimizing instances of hand–mind mismatch.
In addition, I note that a key indicator of the hand–mind mismatch phenomenon is time-based. As a device of distributed memory, a switch's interaction with the hand is time-dependent — broadly speaking, a kind of muscle memory.
I am still conducting data analysis in this area; it is just that the Jeju Air and Air India incidents have made this research feel urgent. I have already begun writing a book, planning to submit to a publisher next year.
Overall, better mitigating the problem of mismatched intention and action requires sufficient identification—not to add more safeguards, but to understand the mechanisms influencing diversion and achieve more effective governance. One small insight of mine is that timing precision for Callout is an effective way to manage the muscle-memory effect.