Volotea, the Airline That Cares - part 2
Catch Me if You Can
What precedes requires an important nuance: the quest for flight hours is confined to the high seasons (late spring to early autumn and December).
Indeed, Volotea's activity remains highly seasonal, although this trend is decreasing. Thus, during the off-seasons, pilots are scheduled to fly less than 50 hours per month, with little chance of exceeding the guaranteed minimum of 50 hours. The only variable part of the remuneration then comes from various allowances (per diem, layover, standby, etc.).
There is then no incentive to fly more, especially when a standby is planned. Indeed, being activated during standby results in the loss of the standby allowance, and this loss is only half compensated by the per diem allowance. So, by being activated, a pilot will fly hours that will not increase his/her salary and will receive a lower allowance than if he/she had not been activated.
This absurdity pushes some to develop strategies to avoid being activated during standby in the low season.
Walking Dead
The strong correlation between remuneration and flight hours and the need to compensate for low-activity months with high-activity months push crews to fly even when they are sick or fatigued. It is not uncommon to get to the briefing room, greet the crew, and have a pilot or cabin crew member take a step back so as not to shake hands or hug, declaring they are sick, sometimes even with a suspected case of COVID.
These situations can create tension between those who want to avoid getting sick—and thus potentially losing workdays—and those who are sick and want to do everything to avoid going on sick leave.
Fatigue is less of a source of conflict, but it raises the question of fitness to fly. Saying that crews are not encouraged to declare fatigue is an understatement.
From a personal and financial perspective, declaring fatigue means being withdrawn from all flights until the next day off, resulting in a loss of salary.
From the company's perspective, this means notifying the authorities and thus increased scrutiny from the regulatory body. Volotea has therefore implemented a protocol aimed at containing fatigue declarations through a decision tree that directs crew members more towards sick leave or a declaration of unfitness.
Thus, all Volotea pilots have flown while sick/fatigue or with a sick/fatigued colleague, sometimes resulting in situations where one relies entirely on the other to get through the day.
The Flying Monkeys
Volotea recruits all types of profiles for both FO and captain positions.
FOs are mostly cadets from partner schools or were recruited through internal recommendation campaigns. A minority of FOs join the company with prior experience.
Cadet pilots are usually not rated on the Airbus A320 and must therefore first obtain their type rating to fly this aircraft. Thus, after their assessment, Volotea sends admitted candidates a job offer conditional on obtaining a type rating from its training center (ATO). The job offer is only for a fixed-term contract. Previously, this contract was for about six months (IATA season), but today it is limited to the duration of the line training.
Cadets therefore join Volotea's ATO and undergo six to eight weeks of training, including ground courses on aircraft systems and procedures, simulator sessions, and finally a base training session with real touch-and-goes.
Pilots must bear the cost of the type rating, which is €27,500, as well as ancillary expenses (transport, food, etc.). Note that most European low-cost airlines pass on the cost of the type rating to their crews, and an A320 or B737 type rating is generally billed between €20,000 and €30,000.
Thus, most often, a cadet pilots starts their career heavily in debt because they have had to bear the cost of their initial training (on average between €70,000 and €120,000) and then pay for their type rating.
Captains, for their part, come from all backgrounds: foreign major airlines, cargo, other low-cost airlines, air forces, former Volotea FOs who upgraded, etc.
Volotea recruits direct entry captains and is one of the few companies to recruit non-type rated direct entry captains.
Discovering the reality of Volotea's operations can be a shock for some, especially those coming from companies with considerably more resources.
Volotea pilots can be classified into categories that summarize their motivations for joining and possibly staying with Volotea in the medium or long term: the investors, the tightrope walkers, the apostles, and those lost in limbo.
The Investors – These pilots join Volotea to be rated on the A320 (the most widespread aircraft type in the world) and accumulate flight hours. The goal is to gain experience to meet the requirements of more attractive airlines. Depending on the pilot's final goal (generally between 500 and 1500 hours) and the activity of the assigned Volotea base, this can take one to three IATA seasons on average. There are also FOs, experienced or not, who join Volotea to quickly become captains, accumulate experience as commanders, and then seek to join a more interesting company.
The Tightrope Walkers – These are pilots who have found a balance at Volotea and stay there. Indeed, beyond a deplorable salary, Volotea also offers: many bases in French, Italian, and Spanish provinces; local contracts; a more or less varied network (depending on the base); a certain freedom of action for crews; a good atmosphere among crews; and other collateral advantages. Some manage to compensate for the company's flaws with other elements and willingly resign themselves to staying.
The Apostles – Yes, they exist: pilots who proselytize because Volotea "gave them a chance," Volotea is a "humane company," Volotea is a company full of opportunities, things are changing, it was worse a few years ago, and other arguments that raise eyebrows among their colleagues. They can endure everything Volotea puts them through, always finding an excuse or adopting a positive point of view.
Lost in Limbo – These are tightrope walkers who have lost their balance (e.g., base closure), investors who have not been able to achieve their goals to leave Volotea, or even former apostles whom the company has abused one too many times. They are at Volotea by default, for lack of finding better, waiting for an opportunity and hoping, without believing, for significant improvements.
These archetypes are, of course, caricatures, with each pilot being a mix of each with evolving proportions. Nevertheless, it is striking to note that for a year now, there are more and more "lost in limbo" pilots, even among those with the higher seniority and with the most experience in the company. A feeling of fed-up is setting in and taking over conversations in briefing rooms, cockpits, jet bridges, and bars.
The Zoo Keepers
Employees in the Barcelona offices are not better off than the pilots. It seems that the HQ is plagued by understaffing, high turnover, lack of experience, lack of resources, and more or less structural improvisation. This reality seems to be accepted; Volotea boasts of having proportionally fewer office staff per aircraft than Ryanair.
This ambition is not without consequences for the quality of life of crews (and undoubtedly for office employees): inconsistent and unstable rosters, lack of anticipation, last-minute decision-making, unnecessary expenses, non-compliance with regulatory or internal requirements, etc.
Concretely and in no particular order, this can take the form of:
- A diversion request sent by ACARS because operations had not anticipated that a crew member would exceed duty time if the flight arrived at its destination.
- Activation of standby crews, their positioning, and then cancellation of their activation... and thus their repatriation to their original base with all the transport and possible hotels this implies.
- Failure to take into account alerts raised by crews throughout the day regarding the poor progress of a rotation, leading to a last-minute search for a replacement crew, a search complicated by an insufficient number of people on standby due to the lateness of the reaction.
- Over-recruitment of personnel for a certain position, leading to a decrease in activity and thus a decrease in remuneration.
- Conversely, under-recruitment, leading to unmanageable workload and pushing some to resign... worsening the shortage.
- Scheduling too many crew members on the same flight, whether in the cabin or cockpit.
- Absurd rosters with single or double days off that make any commuting impossible, several changes from late to early shifts and vice versa during the month, or scheduling a sequence of days with early morning rotations and a night rotation on the last day.
- Permanent roster instability with schedule changes that compensate for the lack of anticipation of certain operational constraints, sometimes with undeniable creativity (e.g., staggered distribution of a series of LMSs after the end of several flight days when they were initially planned on a single day).
- Pressure on crews to accept changes, positioning, or duty extensions.
- Concealed retaliatory measures taken against "non-cooperative" crew members (e.g., reduction of flight hours).
- Scheduling of crew members who are not qualified to perform specific rotations (e.g., airport requiring special qualification), leading to delays, costs, and complications due to standby activations and positionings.
- Assignment of inexperienced captains to bases where: the destinations served mostly require minimum experience, and the based FOs are also inexperienced. This implies that these captains have few opportunities to work and that the company must perpetually position captains to perform restrictive rotations, as well as experienced FOs so that the based captains can operate the few rotations they are authorized to fly.
- Administrative tracking errors (e.g., failure to schedule recurrent training or forgetting mandatory procedures with the authorities), leading to a stoppage of flights for several weeks for the affected crew member or urgent planning of a training session, even if it encroaches on days off, while threatening the crew member with salary losses if they refuse to give up their days off.
- Implementation of a team of "floating" captains whose objective is to compensate for the flaws of a system operating permanently in just-in-time mode, but whose assignment sometimes reduces the activity of based captains below 50 hours per month.
- A request for ASU availability sent at each stopover served by a particular aircraft over several days, even though the aircraft does not need it and the crews reported this from the first flight.
- Maintenance teams sent to intervene on the wrong aircraft.
Come Fly With Me
This culture of cost-cutting and constant improvisation is also palpable in the equipment chosen by the company.
All crews concede that Volotea is an airline where you can build experience quickly, thanks to the fact that, within the company's operations, crews are immediately exposed to a wide range of scenarios and constraints that colleagues from few other airlines would have to face.
Thus, pilots and cabin crew must continually adapt to the aircraft assigned to them. Indeed, Volotea only operates second-hand (or third-hand, or fourth-hand, or more) A319s and A320s, from different generations and with a variety of more or less extensive options (e.g., Thales/Honeywell FMS with different software versions, HUD, Spectralux CPDLC, fuel panels in different locations, brake fans, cargo heat, radars, etc.).
The heterogeneous nature of the fleet also implies very varied previous operating conditions for the aircraft, whether in terms of climate or maintenance quality. Some aircraft also enter the fleet after a period of storage. Despite all the necessary maintenance for putting these aircraft back into service, Volotea crews still have to deal with a break-in period of a few months during which, inevitably, failures occur.
Furthermore, the company very easily resorts to "deferred defects," including MEL/CDL items and others. Newcomers quickly learn to know the procedures for starting without an APU, as well as all the degradations acceptable by the MEL. Some items, deemed too expensive to fix, can remain on the Deferred Defect List until the bitter end. Or they can disappear for a few days and then reappear. For example, it is not uncommon to see the same reset performed every few days to solve a recurring failure rather than undertaking a more in-depth and costly fault search.
The aircraft are also very poorly cleaned. Both inside and out, even upon entering the fleet. It is not uncommon to see a “new” aircraft enter the fleet with a gleaming livery but with the landing gear bays and engine interiors found to be covered in oil, grease, and hydraulic fluid. The level of filthiness of some fuselages is such that it is sometimes reported in the DDL, which seems contradictory given the industry's fuel-saving efforts.
Cockpits and cabins are no exception and bear the marks of the passage of many colleagues and passengers.
This lack of consideration for the company's production tools is also felt in the choices of ancillary equipment. Two examples stand out, one ridiculous, the other a bit less:
- The company mobile phones allocated to captains are straight out of the 2000s and are more frequently seen in the hands of dealers in narco TV series than anything else. Many captains prefer to put the company's SIM card in their personal phones or simply use their personal line rather than struggle with the provided tool. Moreover, the operator chosen by Volotea does not provide decent coverage at all the network's stopovers, particularly in Algeria. Thus, it has already happened that the company could not reach a particular crew and had to resort to contacting a crew member on a second Volotea aircraft that, by chance, was at the same stopover and had coverage to pass instructions to the other aircraft.
- Volotea's operational documentation is scattered across several different platforms: EFOS, Aviobook, FlySmart, and Lido. To summarize: almost everything is on EFOS, not quite everything is on Aviobook, some is on FlySmart (FCOM, FCTM, MEL, CDL, and AFM), and on Lido, there is only the Lido documentation. When it is necessary to find information, the task can be arduous. For example, it is necessary to cross-reference manuals and "InfoNotes," which are operational notes that supplement the manuals. These InfoNotes are only available on EFOS and are not classified in the same way as the rest of the documentation. InfoNotes are published at a rate of one to five per week on average, on all subjects, including modifications to SOPs. Opening the InfoNotes database is like entering a flea market; you can find everything and anything, even notes concerning the Boeing 717, which has not been operated by Volotea for years. Another document that replaces the FCOM and OM is the "Volotea Policies," which group together SOPs specific to Volotea. But all these documents can contradict each other or even within themselves from one paragraph to another. Any contradiction that becomes too important is "resolved" through a new... InfoNote, or even a new version of the Volotea Policies.
Cost savings are, of course, felt at many other levels: use of underpowered iPads that do not correctly run company apps, low-end service providers, and even, because, thankfully, ridicule is not fatal, the printing of the latest checklists on thinner paper than the previous ones...
At the same time, the company makes expenditures that leave crews perplexed about their operational usefulness. For example, over the past two years, Volotea has used different providers offering fuel-saving solutions without gaining the adherence of crews due to the inadequacy of the solutions compared to operational conditions.
Cuddle Therapy
At Volotea, if there is one area where management is generous towards the rest of the employees, it is in false benevolent attention, or "caring." This is a part of the company culture that is promoted (or thrown in the face, depending on the point of view) whenever possible in various internal newsletters or meetings and presentations. It is also the response to many ills and the excuse for the difficulties that employees may encounter in their work. Have operations been difficult this season? Yes, but the crews are strong because they support each other!
Killing Hope
Unsurprisingly, caring solves nothing. Worse, the management's attitude and choices testify to a lack of consideration for employees. 2025 alone contains enough examples to illustrate this.
In June 2025, the results of the latest annual mandatory negotiations were announced and presented as major advances for the crews. However, upon closer inspection, the improvements are marginal. Thus, among other things, we find:
- A limitation (but not an elimination) of six-day flight blocks.
- The introduction of a "post-vacation rest" thanks to which the next duty cannot start before 9:00 AM after returning from leave (except in exceptional cases).
- A compensation of €20 in case of cancellation of a rotation after the start of the duty (but not the remuneration of lost BH).
- A symbolic salary increase for FOs at the two lowest levels (the base salary for SO2s is still below the French minimum wage).
- The prorating of minimum guaranteed hours during leave so that taking leave does not imply a loss of salary (implementation only from January 1, 2026).
- The possibility for crews to obtain confirmed tickets on Volotea flights (only if booked 90 days in advance).
- Christmas gift vouchers worth €40 (the reader will appreciate the amount).
The gap between the fanfare accompanying these advances and their timidity is a stark reminder that Volotea is not about to give in to significantly improve the working conditions of its crews.
Looking back at 2025, it is easy to find other indicators that confirm this trend, primarily the fact that management systematically avoided making itself available to initiate discussions about the next annual mandatory negotiations or the renegotiation of the roster change agreement (they have only just begun).
Furthermore, the repressive attitude adopted by management in response to the increase in absenteeism testifies to the refusal of executives to acknowledge the reality of working conditions within Volotea.
One of the root causes for which management accepts to bear partial responsibility is fatigue. However, management also notes that crews take sick leaves that coincides with requested but refused days off, or directly adjacent to days off or leave, or to attend assessments for other airlines. But at no point does management take a step back to understand why its crews would resort to these practices in a justified manner. Thus, it is not mentioned that:
- The acceptance of requests for days off is totally random (e.g., requested days off refused, but other off days granted for the days immediately preceding those requested).
- Leave requests are sometimes accepted partially and absurdly (e.g., one day ON in the middle of 15 days of leave).
- There is such a gap with the working conditions offered by other companies that Volotea crews are willing to take risks for themselves and Volotea's operations to aspire to something better.
Finally, the best indicator of management's total disconnection with its employees, and confirmation that not much will change, comes directly from our CEO. In October, employees received an email announcing record financial results for 2025 and the best margins ever achieved by the company from the outset. The email then delves into an explanation of the financing strategy and equity stakes, self-congratulation regarding the viability of the company's model, and the announcement of good prospects for 2026. A "Thank you for making this possible!" is quickly slipped in towards the end, and an encouragement to continue in this vein is given as a conclusion. And that's it.
It is undeniable that Volotea would not be a viable company without the financial participation of its shareholders or rigorous management by its leaders, but does it not also thrive thanks to the work of its employees? Do they not deserve to directly benefit from the financial returns of their work and efforts? Are the margins generated by Volotea not partly the result of social conditions well below the market average?
To this day, the mention of this email provokes mockery and tension, especially in light of the fact that the average salary of management increased by 22% between 2023 and 2024, while over the same period that of FOs decreased by 8% and that of captains increased by 1.6%.
Outlook
Given the above, it may seem surprising that to date there has been no mobilization by Volotea crews. It may be that part of the explanation lies in the company's model. Indeed, the scattering of crews across 19 bases and three countries means that each person's professional circle is often limited to the personnel of their base, plus a few acquaintances here and there within the network. Federating and coordinating hundreds of people who do not know each other and are dispersed in this way requires a long-term effort. So far, this effort has been in vain because it is impossible to widely federate when a large portion of the pilots are only passing through the company. Furthermore, crew members who stay at Volotea are attached to their position and will be less inclined to mobilize against the company for fear of repercussions. Under these conditions, mobilizing across the company seems a very difficult task.
However, some signals may indicate that hope is not in vain. Here and there in certain bases, protest movements are emerging that lead to concrete results. For example, rumor has it that pilots of a Spanish base reportedly managed to obtain a fixed pattern roster by declaring themselves fatigued on the last day of a sequence of days ON. Furthermore, it is striking to note that during 2025, undeniable defiance was manifested unanimously among the crews towards management, even among captains with significant seniority.
Nevertheless, management seems to do everything to avoid admitting that the working conditions within Volotea constitute a problem that is only worsening over time. The past year has thus seen many internal communications boasting haphazardly about roster improvements, better operations management, reductions in APU-related problems, improvement of the vacation granting system, etc. However, these improvements seem like very little compared to the road that remains ahead...
Furthermore, when cornered by pilots complaining about the company's working conditions, Volotea executives repeatedly state that conditions are better than they were before, use fear by reminding that many companies are currently going bankrupt, and close the discussion by inviting pilots to look for work elsewhere if they are unhappy.
These responses raise several questions. Because conditions were worse before, does that imply that we should be satisfied with the progress made since? Is it unacceptable to aspire to better despite everything? What comparisons can be made between Volotea and SmartLynx or Spirit or Air Belgium or PLAY or Blue Islands? These examples have nothing to do with Volotea's model and to this date no further insight has been provided... Finally, the invitation to leave the company shows in itself the management's lack of consideration for the crews who fly their planes and confirms, if necessary, that Volotea's model also relies on a permanent renewal of its crews.
This renewal is important for Volotea for three reasons. First, as explained earlier, the lack of projection within the company implies a low incentive to mobilize against existing conditions. Second, the regular arrival of non-qualified pilots allows Volotea to generate secondary revenue by charging its pilots for their training. Finally, these pilots cost little to the company since they have the least seniority, and Volotea's line supervision captains are also cheap (€27 per flight hour) and numerous (95 LSCs for about 440 pilots).
But is this model sustainable? Worse, does it not compromise flight safety?
Indeed, the low base salary and the strong correlation between salary and flight hours push pilots to take risks. This results in pilots flying while sick or fatigue because any reduction of flight hours would imply too great a loss of salary and consequently an under reporting of fatigue.
To the crews flying sick or fatigued, we must add the lack of experience (on type or within the company) that is sometimes present in Volotea's aircraft due to the high turnover within its ranks.
In addition, crews are required to fly complicated operations with equipment that is subpar.
Once all this is factored in, one cannot help but wonder about the resilience of Volotea's model.
Bring Solutions, Don't Just Complain
As part of its low-cost embellishment efforts, Volotea has found itself a corporate culture and developed "Principles in Action." In the event that some Volotea executives have read this far, we will invoke one of them: "Bring Solutions, Don't Just Complain."
Dear Management Team,
The idea behind Volotea is brilliant, the offer you have developed and continue to enrich is undoubtedly the right one. The agility and adaptability with which Volotea faces the ever-renewed challenges of our sector is impressive. Thank you for your risk-taking, your superhuman efforts, your unique vision—Volotea would not be where it is today without you!
But it is time to remind you that Volotea is also what it is thanks to us, your crews. You are incredibly lucky to employ people who have chosen their career out of passion and are willing to do anything to live it. For us pilots, this passion is undoubtedly one of our greatest weaknesses because it has allowed operators to take advantage of their privileged position as kingmakers. As a result, our working conditions worldwide have only deteriorated, calling into question our physical and mental health as well as the safety of the operations we are asked to carry out. Volotea has fully subscribed to this approach, and it is not acceptable.
Your crews have had enough, they are tired of seeing their relationships with the airline only through the prism of confrontation, frustrated at each roster publication, anxious as soon as a roster change notification arrives, disillusioned with the state of our aircraft and all the cost saving measures, and weary of having to manage almost alone the vagaries of our operations. And what about your FOs who are in a precarious financial situation?
We deeply love our work, which is why we have sacrificed so much to be entrusted with an aircraft, and some have invested hundreds of thousands of euros to train. So, what good are your encouragements and thanks when we bear the responsibility of 180 passengers and equipment worth tens of millions of euros?
You know all too well the demands of your crews for having systematically ignored, belittled, or discredited them. At the dawn of 2026, driven by record results over the past two years, Volotea must make a significant leap forward to improve the working conditions of its crews. Without this, Volotea would only discredit itself further and worsen the precarity of its position.
It is time for you to stop looking away, to acknowledge that your crews remuneration and the never ending cost-cutting measures have become a safety issue, to recognize your employees’ distress, and, in short, for safety and respect to finally prevail over caring.
From Volotea Pilots