Heathrow Crash
Response to 'normally right blank' - GCA controller.
Milt was a Vulcan TP at Boscombe Down on a 4 hour standby with a spare aircraft and crew ALL of the several weeks that Vulcan XA897 was away on that Australian/ New Zealand trip. Didn't know at the time that the RAAF was interested in acquiring Vulcans. I and crew had been shot full of innoculations for African bugs as we planned to scamper down via Africa with this spare aircraft if any malfunction was to occur with 897 when Down Under. I planned to break some records.
Imagine my disappointment, as an Australian Flt Lt on TP exchange, that the malfunction did not happen until the last few seconds of the mission. Incidently Wg Cdr Clive Saxelby was then my CO. He just happened to be one of those who figured in the "Great Escape" - was it Colditz?
Three factors set up the Heathrow crash if we accept the weather as being right on minimums.
1. Reception committee assembled at Heathrow with resultant pressure on inexperienced (negligible IFR time on Vulcan) and non cohesive/standard crew to make a landing in conditions which would normally have justified a diversion.
2. Approach speed of the Vulcan being below minimum drag speed. This results in increased sink rate if the pilot tries to adjust approach angle with increased alpha and no thrust increase to compensate for the increasing drag with decreasing speed.
3. The Civil GCA controllers were prohibited at the time from giving vertical guidance to aircraft after they had passed through 500 ft AGL.
My test experience on Vulcan discounts PEC and altimeter friction as being amongst all those other possibles that a court of inquiry postulates.
So Podge Howard was really in the 'hot seat' but all would have been well if not for two things. Cessation of vertical guidance and the aircraft already sinking below glide slope.
As they were passing through 500 ft they were advised that they were beginning to sink below the GCA glide slope. At this point vertical guidance ceased although azimuth guidance continued. The sink rate kept increasing without adequate recognition until they emerged from the cloud base. Slamming the throttles to max, (and what wonderful engines they were - idle to max thrust in a tab over 2 seconds) was just too late. The control surfaces dragged across a field of cabbages to be damaged beyond useability and resulted in uncontrollable pitch up.
I didn't know at that time that Civil GCA controllers ceased vertical giudance at 500 ft. I doubt whether Podge Howard knew that either.
Somthing to do with insurance I think. How crazy!! Did that practice continue??
Vulcan and F-111 followed by Mustang rate as my favourite aircraft out of 90 plus. Valiant prototype No 2 (WB215) came close to doing me in when a wing main spar broke. This was after an AUW measured take off using Super Sprite rocket units. Might just open up another thread on broken wings and fatigue.