Heathrow crash
Milt
According to Andrew Brookes: “Crash!”, Ian Allan 1991, it was 1 October 1956 that the RAF’s first operational Vulcan XA897, call sign “Mike Papa Quebec Kilo 11” crashed at Heathrow on a GCA approach.
The C-in-C Sir Harry Broadhurst was in the co-pilot’s seat. The captain Sqn Ldr Donald “Podge” Howard had joined in the ranks, gained a commission after flying training in America, had won a double DFC for low level ground attack during the war. After commanding a Canberra squadron he was seconded to Avro to “grow up with the aircraft”.
In the back sat the navigator Sqn Ldr Edward Eames, AFC. There was no bomb-aimer, as the equipment and radar was not ready yet. Instead on the navigators left sat Flt Lt (Acting Sqn Ldr) James Stroud, a Vulcan pilot with Master Green instrument rating like the captain.
“Tasman” flight was supported on a trip to Australia and New Zealand by three Shackletons carrying ground crew and support equipment. One stayed at Aden. The other two going on to Paya Lebar in Malaya. A Canberra PR7 acted as back up. If the Vulcan went unserviceable, Sir Harry would leap into the PR7 to the next official engagement. Howard and Stroud would bring on the Vulcan later.
The rear trio was completed by signaller Sqn Ldr Albert Gamble. By the entrance door sat Avro tech. service rep. Frederick Bassett.
In lashing rain the aircraft touched down 1.030 yards before the runway, was damaged by a ditch and on climb out became uncontrolable rolling to the right. Only the two with ejection seats got out.
A bitter set of inquiries followed - one of them from the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation defending the GCA system. “Someone” put out James Stroud as second navigator in a press release. Even his death certificate described him as navigator causing much bitterness amongst family and colleagues.
A Boscome scientific study found extra pressure error on the Vulcan close to the ground, that with altimeter friction could be as much as 200 ft. At the “break off “ height (minima today?) of 300 feet they came very close to the ground. (Even without the postulated sudden last second descent.)
There are many more details in Brookes chapter on this tragedy, but his final remark is worth mentioning:
“... the importance of being up to speed on instrument flying skills before the foul weather comes. It also proved that it does not pay to put your latest, largely untried aircraft into your latest, barely opened international airport for vainglorius reasons.”
(The book is out of print but well worth searching for ISBN 0 7110 1965 7)
This became a little long but the Heathrow crash has intrigued me being a GCA controller myself.
Best regards