Hmmmm, I won’t comment on your second paragraph on an open forum DtP, but I’d love to debate the point with you over a coldie sometime (and so, I suspect, would Hassan or Grainger, FOM 20.2 notwithstanding).
Your reply illustrates my point all too clearly, (and I have made this very point in submissions to the powers that be), that I doubt if there are ten captains out of the 400+ captains in the airline who would follow the full EOP for 12 – certainly not any who’ve given the matter any thought, anyway – and I very much doubt ATC would let you if you wanted to.
So we’re left with the strange – some would say silly – situation where there are possibly 400 different ‘private EOPs’ for 12 tucked away in 400 different minds, and God only knows what some of those may be. Which is why I’d so dearly like to see something official down on paper that reflects what we would – or should – do if one of us were ever to find himself carrying out the EOP for 12 for real one day. The moment you move out of the groove ATC expect you to be following, the frequency is going to be going into overload – just when you’d prefer to be dealing with an absolute minimum of radio calls.
Like you, DtP, (and, I suspect like many pilots who use DXB), I’ve got my own private procedure for 12, which is very similar to yours – “as soon as the aircraft is fully cleaned up, request a turn left onto a track of 300 and continue climbing to 3000’ ”.
This leaves me with the Sharjah right in front of me for a straight in onto 30 if the problem turns into a really serious time-critical one, and heading out to sea (where I’m going to be sent eventually anyway to jettison fuel). It also puts me in a nice position to set myself up for an approach back onto 12 with minimum delay after I’ve dealt with the non-normal, as well as being out of everyone’s way (with the possible exception of SHJ traffic as I groan on past SHJ, but I’m sure the powers that be would prefer that to overflying the palace and the high rises on Sheikh Z Road on one engine).
Your comment regarding ‘…programmatical thinking that should disqualify people from command’ is unworthy, although we all know that there are people out there who will follow the book blindly because it is ‘the book’, even when it’s blatantly obvious that a slightly different course of action would be more appropriate, even safer. This is why I’d so dearly love to see ‘the book’ reflect what we should do and why I’d like to see an officially designated jettison area promulgated rather than have to sort that point with ATC out on the day. (Imagine, a jettison area WPT with a designated holding pattern in the FMC database – even a full FMC EOP – and all you have to do is punch it in, hit LNAV, and you can get on with the non-normal. No talking to ATC required beyond “engine failure, following the EOP.”)
The powers that be in EK agree that an aircraft would be highly unlikely to follow the 12 EOP completely, but say that DXB ATC won’t agree to change the procedure because it’s the ICAO officially recognised procedure for the runway. I raised the point here asking if a DXB ATCO could explain why they won’t. I suspect it may have a lot to do with not infringing the Sharjah circuit, as any immediate left turn would do, but surely an EOP that demands DXB ATC simply inform SHJ by landline to hold their traffic for no more than five to ten minutes is streets ahead of one that demands multiple radio calls with the aircraft having the problem?
There’s going to be enough talking as it is if someone ever does lose and engine on takeoff off 12. Why not do a little bit of planning ahead of time so that both the pilots and the controllers know as much as possible what the other party will be doing on points that can be agreed upon ahead of time rather than doing it all ‘on the fly’ on the day?