Originally Posted by
Pilot DAR
.........what if software delayed any action to shut down a second engine by umpteen seconds? Sure, pilot action for a first engine event. But, is there any need for instant action behind that for a second engine shut down!.....
Because introducing software between cut-off switches and the engine will also introduce a whole raft of potential failures and malfunctions. I would be interested to know how the eJet is configured to accomplish this.
Originally Posted by
arf23
I hear the arguments against, which is pilots are well trained, but with Kegworth we now have at least 3 recent instances where the wrong/both engines were shut down. I would suggest at the least, if not my suggested solution, than a safety body should take this issue onboard as a priority and come up with a solution for the next generation of passenger jets..........
After Kegworth, they did. It was found that the Boeing engine displays were potentially confusing: In the Boeing 737 they consisted of two sets of vertical columns of engine parameter gauges. The column nearest the LHS had the major parameters such as N1, EGT, fuel flow, N2. The column nearest the RHS had secondary parameters such as Oil pressure, oil temperature and quantity, engine vibration etc.
So scanning the columns of gauges from left to right it went left engine, right engine, left engine, right engine. This is believed to have caused confusion as to whether the high vibration reading was referring to the left or the right engine, since the vibration gauge was to the right of all the primary gauges
Recommendations were made suggesting that Boeing change the gauge layout so that they were all fully symmetrical, so that left gauge meant left engine, and right gauge meant right engine, but I don't know if they ever did this ?
Originally Posted by
tdracer
The current layout of the Boeing fuel control switches has remained the same for 70 years - literally generations of pilots know and use this layout.
The potential of a redesign introducing undesirable unintended consciences is very high - especially if it's a knee-jerk response. Something like this needs to be carefully and thoroughly vetted before it sees the light of day. For example, requiring the thrust lever at idle - what if the lever gets jammed somehow and can't be moved to idle?......
Agreed. (You've still got the fire handle or fire push-button to shut an engine down if the thrust lever is jammed)..
.......As I understand it, Kegworth both pilots agreed on the engine - it's just that they were both wrong....
See above re gauge layout.
......I think the first step is to better educate and train the pilots that there is almost never a reason to rush shutting down a turbofan engine. Even with an engine fire, the bult in protections give you minutes to take action, not seconds..........
There are lots of ways a panicked pilot can crash an aircraft - shutting down the wrong engine is just one. Maybe the answer is to get pilots to not panic?
Things like EICAS/ECAM have made it far easier to correctly identify a malfunctioning engine - are pilots being appropriately trained to use that?
Yes. Every 6 months we practise engine shut-downs in the SIM - usually during, or immediately after take-off; a high stress situation.
As some have asked or suggested, there is no urgency or reason to quickly shut down a gas turbine engine, even if it is on fire.
The overriding priority is to FLY and control the aircraft; i.e. get it under control (usually with a large amount of rudder, given that the thrust might suddenly have become very asymmetric), and climb safely away. So gear needs to come up, for example.
Audible warnings are cancelled and we "ignore" the failed engine or the engine on fire until we are safely climbing away. Only then do we begin the drills, starting with "what happened ?" Then we must consider the flight path and the terrain ahead. Since our rate of climb will now be much lower than normal, we might not clear obstacles ahead, and we might have to make an emergency turn before completing an engine shut-down.
If an engine has failed; before shutting it down both pilots very carefully check the engine instruments, or ECAM/EICAS, AND also all the warning lights on the overhead panel to double check and confirm that the "correct" engine is being shut down. Both of us also check and confirm that each critical switch or lever is the correct one before moving it.
So, yes, we are trained and rehearsed very carefully and intensively to perform engine shut-downs carefully and diligently.
Having said that it's in a simulator, which you know is not going to kill you, and therefore you don't necessarily have that extra factor of the real world coming at you, and the real world can change behaviour.
And one hopes the same high standards are demanded throughout the World.
One thing though I think needs to change is airline pilot trainers examining their own pilots. There is a potential incentive for company type rating examiners, TREs, to get their pilots through their SIM exams. I personally think that SIM exams should be conducted by aviation authority examiners, who do not know the candidates. This might help reveal issues, if they existed.
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