Below are the recommendations made by the French Bureau Enquetes-Accidents (BEA - equivalent to the ATSB) following their investigation into the mid-air collision between Airbus A320 F-GJVG and Grob 103 F-GCXB on 12 February 1999. The translation from the French is mine so there may be some detail inaccuracies, however I believe that the substance of the recommendations has been rendered into English accurately.
To set the scene, this accident occurred while the A320 was following a STAR in Class G airspace on arrival into a Class D CTR at Montpellier Mediterranee, France, in VMC. Although warned of the presence of glider activity (OCTA) by a broadcast on the ATIS, the crew of the A320 did not see the other aircraft until too late. Neither did the crew of the glider see the A320 until too late. Naturellement, the glider was not transponder equipped.
Although both aircraft took avoiding action, a collision occurred. By great good fortune, although both aircraft were damaged they were both landed safely without further incident.
This was the second mid-air collision in France within six months between an RPT aircraft and a VFR aircraft, in VMC in Class G airspace. Of course, Class E airspace would have made no difference.
Recommendations of the Bureau Enquetes-Accidents following the mid-air collision between Airbus A320 F-GJVG and Grob 103 glider F-CGXB near Grenouillet, France, on 12 February 1999.
Several measures were taken following the accident:
- the center of gliding of Montpellier Pic Saint Loup will temporarily maintain all of its activity at an altitude lower than 4 500 feet.
- During a meeting held on March 16, 1999, the director of airspace decided to change the limits and the classification of the airspace relating to the airport of Montpellier Mediterranee. These modifications, which came into force on May 20, 1999, will be published to users by way of the aeronautical information service.
Lastly, it is expected that new agreements will be negotiated in order to integrate the gliding activity of Saint Martin de Londres in the airspace thus modified. Taking note of these measures, the BEA:
4.1. Makes again the following recommendation, put forth on February 24, 1999 within the framework of the investigation into the mid-air collision which occurred on July 30, 1998 in the Bay of Quiberon between Beech 1900 D registered F-GSJM and Cessna 177 registered F-GAJE:
- that within the shortest time, the DGAC makes provisions so that the crew of any aircraft involved in the public transport of passengers, under the IFR, can be informed of any aircraft representing a potential risk of collision. This objective could be met by the three following complementary strategies:
1) the designation of classes of adapted airspaces, or specific airspace, ensuring the protection of published IFR routes;
2) the equipment of aircraft carrying out the public transport of passengers with TCAS, without awaiting the limiting date fixed by regulation;
3) requirement for the use of transponders with altitude reporting for any aircraft operating above revised reference levels.
4.2. Recommends:
- that the DGAC makes, on a purely transitional basis, provisions so that, except in the event of operational need or reasons related to safety, aircraft on an IFR flight plan do not receive clearances to deviate from a published route when this is likely to lead them to be operated in airspace where the knowledge of any aircraft presenting a potential risk of collision is not guaranteed.
4.3. Recommends:
- that, when portions of airspace managed by the Defence organization and crossings by arrival and departure routes are not active any more, they can be used by Civil aviation in order to protect these routes and to allow continuity in the application of the supervising authority.
4.4. Recommends:
- that meetings are regularly organized by the services of the Civil aviation authority at general aviation aerodromes in order to discuss with users questions relating to their activity, in particular when changes are brought in the organization of the airspace and that if need be, draft agreements binding the users to the Civil aviation authority and with the Defense authorities are amended.
4.5. Note that, contrary to the aeroplane flight guide, the existence of traffic IFR in class G airspace does not appear explicitly in the gliding flight guide. This gap was not identified as being contributory to the accident, the two occupants of the sailplane being also powered aeroplane pilots, but it represents a potential weakness of the safety system. It was also raised in the ultralight flight guide. Even if the taking into account of the first three recommendations decreases the probability of the presence of IFR traffic in class G airspace, this remains possible. Consequently, the BEA recommends:
- that theoretical training manuals for glider and ultralight pilots are amended in order to bring to pilots knowledge of IFR flights in class G airspace.