In the old days, we just called it "settling with power" and left it at that. Now, the technoids tell us that it's really "vortex ring state" and suddenly it's a blanket that covers every accident for which we have no other explanation.
We like to break down, dissect and thoroughly analyze every control movement, puff of wind, and pilot thought leading up to every accident. Well guess what - helicopters are tricky. People like to think that they're easy to fly, but the reality is that they're easier to crash! It's deceptively easy for a pilot (especially a low-timer) to let the ship just "get away" from him. Lose your ground cushion when you're already at max power? BANG! Get a little too much of a RoD going near the ground without either sufficient power available or a timely enough application of it? BANG! Terminate a little too fast with a touch of tailwind? BANG! It's just too easy to "fall off the basketball."
I agree with "overpitched" that strict VRS is not the direct cause of the loss of too many airframes. But if a pilot invokes it, who can say or prove otherwise? Take an otherwise-good helicopter and roll it up in a ball? Obviously he/she did something wrong. It's still a pilot-error thing.
However, I disagree with "overpitched" that pilots should not practice quick-stops. And why not? It's not an emergency maneuvre, and I can think of a number of reasons why one might be required at an airport. For example, shooting your approach to one place at the tower's request when your actual parking spot is over there. A short air-taxi ending with a quick-stop might be just the ticket, rather than a long hover-taxi. Quick-stops are good coordination exercises. ...If you do 'em right, of course.