Into the lion's den...
I've just had a week of training for the multi-engine IR, terminating with a CAAFU test. I'm convinced that the way the EFATO is taught and tested will probably kill more pilots than it saves in the long run. I don't have statistical evidence to back this up, but I would like to put the safety case for doing it differently.
The simulation, as I was taught and tested, takes the following form. The examiner/instructor covers the throttle quadrant and retards one throttle to idle.
The student then:
1) Identifies the failed engine (after which the examiner removes the cover)
2) Checks (or requests a check) for fire
3) Applies full power
4) Checks gear and flap up
5) Completes touch drills
a) verifies the dead engine by closing the throttle
b) touches the prop lever to feather
c) touches the mixture to pull
Note that the ordering of items 1 and 3 are an artefact of the simulation. The student cannot apply full power until the examiner uncovers the throttle quadrant.
The entire procedure is expected to take 12 to 15 seconds. The identification of the failed engine needs to take place in perhaps 4 to 5 seconds in order for the remaining parts of the drill to be timely. Thus, from the first signs of yaw, the student is taught, in effect, to make the decision to shut down an engine in less than 5 seconds.
Like most students have, in one of the many practices, but thankfully not in the exam
, I called the wrong engine. We know that in real life, identifying a failed engine correctly is challenging -- although the Kegworth accident has many differences in circumstance, I think it illustrates the point.
Do we really need that haste?
My understanding is that it is prompted by the need to:
i) feather the prop while it can still be feathered
ii) avoid the extra drag of a windmilling prop for an extended period
I would contend that:
a) most engine failures are progressive
b) many engine failures are partial -- some thrust remains which may be better than zero thrust
c) there are few failures that would lead to the prop stopping between, say, 10 seconds and 30 seconds after the first evidence of failure, i.e. leading to a different outcome between a drill taking 10 seconds and one taking much longer with careful analysis
d) even if it did stop before it could be feathered because of oil loss, it would probably feather or get close to feathered by the nature of the CSU mechanism.
e) on many if not most occasions, light twins are operated at weights and in terrain where an
adequate rate of climb (or even shallow descent) can be maintained on one engine with the other prop windmilling
In other words, in training pilots for the worst case scenario, are we instilling in them a habit that may get them killed in a scenario with much higher probability?