Even more subtleties Shawn. The mechanics of the system often leads to problems as you describe, but many authorities ‘request’ very high break out forces to prevent inadvertent rudder input. Commercial crews have to stretch their legs etc and its not good customer relations to kick the rudder and spill the gin; but seriously it is a problem for cabin crew when the pilots leave their seats in a clumsy manner.
Also there is the issue of the intent of the design. For the ‘Bus’ design the rudder was not intended to either induce or correct roll, i.e. no use of secondary effect. Nor was rudder used for turn co-ordination unless there was a double YD failure. Thus the crew only has to use the rudder on the runway during takeoff or landing, or late in the flare to align the aircraft in a crosswind. Yaw control with engine failure does require rudder input, but even this function in more recent types is automated.
This point emphasizes a growing safety concern due to the gap in the assumptions made by the design and type certification, and those made by the operational certification and in the use of the system by the crew. A typical example is a requirement for the operator to have a policy on the use of automation, who then uses Airbus philosophies in a mixed fleet of Airbus and Boeing aircraft – and the ops cert team agrees with it! So not only do the manufacturers have to cope with differing standards of aircrew behaviors, but also the vagaries of the operational certification and airline training.
This problem in part, ought to be addressed by the proposed joint FAA/JAA AC on human factors, requiring the design to be thoroughly documented, but without requirement to ensure that the design principles or assumptions are transferred to flight training and operations. And even if this does happen there could be several years lag in what should occur and what operators expect to happen.