Originally Posted by
SLXOwft
Unless I am being completely thick (always possible), they seem to be looking for something capable of hitting a submerged target beyond the range of its current or future heavyweight torpedoes. Assuming an entry point fairly close to the target, they are therefore looking at a c.35Nmi + range, so something exceeding three times the range of the Mk41 VLS launched RUM-139 VL-ASROC (or for those of us of a certain age, that of Ikara) or more than one and a half times that of the Japanese Type 07 Vertical Launch Anti-Submarine Rocket (also Mk41 VLS launchable).
(My emphasis)
Indeed - but you do have to wonder why bother? The aforementioned RN careers publication featured a draw on an Ikara firing with a Sea King dipping. A bit of research suggests that Ikara could be fed updates in flight - presumably after the firing ship received updates for the Pinger? This shows that the torpedo had to be released very near the target - just as if a helicopter had delivered it. Which begs the question of why not drop the torpedo from the helicopter - either the Pinger or something like a Wildcat acting as a Pony? The Royal Navy pioneered the use of helicopters for ASW, the first operational ASW sorties by a shipborne helicopter taking place towards the end of the Second World War, and the torpedo carrying Wasp was the response to the increasing range of submarine launched torpedoes. These were always meant to be teamed up with carrier based ASW helicopters with dipping sonar - a major part of the RN carrier role since 1960.
Not so many years ago I saw an Ikara on display at HMS
Collingwood, and when I mentioned this to two old and bold ASW types they both agreed that better and faster helicopters, such as the Lynx which replaced the Wasp, was a better solution.
Today the Type 23s updated with 2087 can detect the submarine at long range (the Type 26 will inherit 2087) but because of the range you need something else (typically a Merlin HM2 with dipping sonar) to pinpoint the submarine and attack, so I see little value in a weapon that will still need the Merlin (or MPA) to pinpoint the submarine, and tie up the finite number of VLS cells in the process.
On an ASW theme - the Russians have been making a show of
exercises in the Barents Sea that involve firing submarine launched cruise missiles against targets representing NATO amphibious forces.Not only is the submarine launched cruise missile a weapon of sea denial (not sea control), but the firings have taken place in waters close to Russia, with Russian fighters aircraft nearby. The submarine firing anti ship cruise missiles in the Norwegian Sea, GIUK gap, or beyond would face huge problems:
1. NATO tracks all Russian submarines.
2. NATO has strong ASW forces - including shipborne (including carrierborne) ASW helicopters that act on conjunction with surface warships with long range sonar and coordinated with NATO submarines and MPA.
3. Any attempt to use aircraft against helicopters or MPA will result in a quick response from the carrier's jets.
4. As submarines have limited means to detect targets at long range, the cruise missiles will depend on targeting platforms - possibly aircraft. In the Cold War dealing with Bears performing this role was a job for carrier based aircraft, and the primary role for the Royal Navy's Sea Harrier. It was the need for ASW helicopters operations around the the clock, and to deal with the Bears doing reconnaissance and targeting, that kept the Royal Navy in the carrier game and led to the
Invincible class CVS/Sea King/Sea Harrier combination.
5. Back in the 1970s it was expected that the fighters (certainly the USN F-14 Tomcat, less so the Sea Harrier FRS1 with only Sidewinder) would be able to splashed missiles. Not so long ago a USN F/A-18E/F Super Hornet proved this in the Red Sea, and an Israeli F-35I did so not too long before that. The increased missile load and sensor capabilities of today's aircraft means they can counter a salvo of missiles.
6. A submarine cannot control the airspace, and therefore a group of submarines cannot perform a sea control role in the same way as a carrier group.
7. It is interesting that the quoted Russian news article referred to
a target simulating a detachment of landing ships of a mock enemy. This actually reminds us of the need for sea control, and the need for carriers to protect amphibious forces.