System redundancy at Airbus at least means that: redundancy. Different systems. At Boeing, it's misinterpreted to mean "more of the same".
Airbus's ELACs are truly redundant Motorola and Intel systems at the hardware level, and programmed in different languages, by different teams, precisely to provide redundancy at the code/microprocessor level. You might get a hint of why that matters right about when all three GCUs fail at the same time in a 787 because of a coding error.
See here for more detail:
Why so many computers for flight controls in A320?
I'm also noting that Boeing did another booboo with their integrated IRSs in the 787 that can no longer operate independently of GNSS. That's (really) bad news when you're being spoofed.
The 787 (and the MAX) are piss poor designs that should never have been approved to fly. Can't wait for one of the first few 787's that came off the line to get a lightning strike in the wing. They're an accident waiting to happen. Which is only acceptable in which world? Right. Accounting world. And that's who runs that company these days.
Shame.