Originally Posted by
EXDAC
As a retired system guy I don't think it's fair to characterize taping of static ports as a pitot-static system failure. The ports correctly passed the sensed port pressure to the air data system and the system gave the correct airspeed and altitude indications for the sensed presssures. (I'm thinking of AeroPeru)
It's certainly true that very silly basic mistakes can cause catastrophic events but let's distinguish between human error and systems failure.
Afaik training always includes airspeed, altitude, AoA unreliable scenarios. For every accident where the flight deck crew got it wrong, there are probably at least 100 incidents (non-incidents) where the crew responded correctly and got on the ground safely.
Thinking about Aeroperu 603 physically distresses me, but all they had to do was chill out, level the airplane, and set typical power/pitch/flaps while they got situational awareness and came up with a rational plan. I think these are memory items although maybe not at the time. Still: They had plenty of time flying level. They had the illuminated coast in view if close enough. They had hours. Not realizing that secondary radar (transponder) altitude would be BS if the aircraft had unreliable altitude is a really profound mistake that would not be made after a minute or three of putting the aircraft into a reasonably safe configuration and taking a few deep breaths.
What pilot doesn't know that ATC can't give you a reliable altitude if your aircraft doesn't have one? I would hope, ZERO.
AF 447 was pilot error 100%. Temporarily frozen pitot wasn't an unexpected or even unusual condition.
Birgenair harder to catch, but again, a rejected takeoff based on clearly understood airspeed difference AND clear operational rules would have made it a nothing burger.
XL888, idk, dual AoA failure combined with the aircraft's reliance on AoA and complex changes to flight laws and modes, tough one to solve.