The point every Network pilot is missing is that you only exist in the Qantas group because you are cheap. 50% cheaper, less the bonuses paid to your management for screwing you even further.
It’s a little more complex than that. I would agree with that assessment pre-pandemic, but the market has changed. I think it would be more accurate to suggest that the ‘cheap’ subsidiary pilots have enabled the groups route structure to be exactly what it is now, while giving the return to shareholders ( mainly executives?) that it has.
Now here we are in 2024 with the number of pilots we have, and the route structure we have.
Should the board
A) Cut the subsidiary pilots loose now that they are becoming more expensive ( in line with the labour market in general) ?
or
B) Pay what the market demands and maintain current route structure and market share?
Option A has several predictable outcomes;
1/ Another media storm and probable court actions that Hudson is trying to avoid.
2/ An inability to hold onto several key customers in West Australia without causing cancellations around the rest of the country.
3/ An opportunity for the no.1 competitor to dive in and gain market share immediately resulting in a stronger competitor over the next few decades.
4/ An inability to continue with the SH A-320 training schedule as planned without, again, causing widespread cancellations around the network.
5/ Brand damage due cancellations exacerbating the loss of market share mentioned in 3.
I would have suggested that Kaboobla was executive management trying to sew seeds of doubt but I don’t think so, holding fast to paradigms of old rather than assessing the market in its current state is more of a pilot trait than that of a business exec.