One expects better of the grown ups, interservice sniping only ends up hurting both sides. I would lay the blame at the at the doors of HMT, the F-35 Program Office, and government by a succession of politicians who refuse to see the changed threat so they can avoid the necessary tax rises. Also the disaster that was the 2010 SDR as justified by the empty coffers left by the government of which he was a member. The government which effectively cut the RAF's Harrier force by assigning airframes to the RN following canning Sea Harrier as F-35s were coming in 2012.
IMHO the problem with F-35 is simply it isn't mature yet and the UK is buying too few to fulfil the roles of the aircraft it replaced. Delaying the next buy may turn out to be sensible though as the UK will get a better version without having to upgrade so many airframes..
Firstly we have looked at what sort of operations we are likely to undertake. The SDR assumptions hold good, but the emphasis has shifted from running two Telic-sized operations together, to more numerous small scale ops such as Sierra Leone. We will retain the ability to conduct high intensity ops. We have also looked at reducing the number of units deploying specifically for individual tasks by making better use of the JRRF pool. Whilst clearly a ship can only be in one place at one time, the potential gains to be realised from investment in network enabled capability, combined with the revised planning assumptions, result in all 3 Services requiring fewer units than before. For the RN this means our DD/FF force will reduce to 25, SSNs to 8 and MCMVs to 16. In addition the peace process in Northern Ireland will result in the disposal of the NIPVs. We have selected which ships will go to ensure that we retain a balance of capabilities. By improving the quality of the networked capability of our major warships we will be able to deliver the desired military effects from a reduced number of platforms. We have therefore decided to set our requirement for T45s at 8 ships.
(...)
In explaining these reductions to our people it is important to focus on the following:
- The government has re-confirmed the central role in joint expeditionary warfare that the Navy will continue to play. (my emphasis)
- The core capabilities of the Navy remain intact and in particular: the carrier strike capability continues to lie at the heart of the versatile maritime force with CVF due to enter service from 2012. The amphibious forces will continue to benefit from new investment and ships.
- We must continue the shift in emphasis away from measuring strength in terms of hull numbers and towards the delivery of military effects. The new ships and submarines will be far more capable than those they replace. The T45, Astute and LSD(A) programmes will begin delivering ships in the next few years. Work continues in the MOD on the MARS (future RFA, JCTS (replacement PCRS/Argus) and FSC programmes.
- We will continue to offer satisfying and rewarding career opportunities to our people
(...)
I do not instinctively welcome the early disposal of good ships and these have been most difficult decisions. They are however essential if we are to ensure that the finite resources available to defence are targeted at the requirements of the 21st Century rather than what we inherited from the 20th. I am confident that these changes will leave the Navy better organised and equipped to face the challenges of the future.
Message from CNS 21 July 2004