Originally Posted by
MechEngr
"Your statement may be true for the original MCAS but it is manifestly untrue for the production software that literally gave seconds for the crew to recognize and respond to the failure before the BS designed for the 707 in 1957 manual trim system became immovable. "
Red the view may be, but the trim switch under the left thumb of the guy in the left seat always functioned. I suppose the switch in the right seat is also under the left thumb. The first crew and second captain managed with zero difficulty; some roller-coaster, but not deadly.
On top of that every flight had far more than seconds (1-5) to deal with the trim loads. I saw red when "The pilots followed the emergency AD exactly" was not in the FDR, at all.
No airline wanted a competitor to the 737 from Boeing. Here's what happens when a company tries that.
The customers say "Is this going to be all new?"
"Yes"
"Then cancel my current orders and I'll wait for the new plane to come out, or maybe I'll just go to Airbus and see what they have if I have to start over."
or they say
"Since I have one common platform for my airline, I will have to toss all of them in the garbage or have incompatible planes and incompatible pilots? Can't you just make the 737 better?"
You guys have missed a very crucial part of those hull losses that the initial mover of them were faulty angle of attack sensors which were only one on each fuselage. It might sound as the MCAS was the main culprit but that's not entirely correct. It doesn't draw the bigger picture.