XH9s Lynx (even if its antenna was plugged in, turned on, its configuration appropriately done etc ) wouldn’t have detected XKQs transponder anyway as the GTX327 is Mode A/C/(maybe S) only not ADSB out.
If XKQs xpdr was an ADSB out then you would expect an appropriately installed, configured and tested Lynx in XH9 to have alerted.
There’s a litany of failures here with equipment installation and setup that’s only been very superficially covered in this report. When was the last transponder check? Other than the pilots working out it didn’t work or was flight IDing the last rego. Was the MR endorsed?
Most of these issues should have been an easy fix for any half competent avionics tech. It beggars belief that XH9 was flying around in commercial ops with the Hex not updated and/or just turned off and then had a “disconnected antenna”. I think there are some rules about that somewhere…
according to the report they still haven’t determined the status of the ground filtering altitude. Is the unit damaged? That’s 3 button presses.
it’s all moot anyway as XKQs avionics were never going to be of any use for ADSB.
ADSB IN/OUT is extremely powerful and having flown with it for many years in lots of busy airspace, I have no doubt that had both aircraft here been equipped with it then the outcome would have been different. The sad reality is that it’s going to be decades before there’s lots of IN unless it’s mandated.
Like I mentioned before, for me the real question here is what’s an appropriate amount of equipment (and inspection regime) for an operation that carries thousands of fare paying passengers a year? It’s less than what you need to fly IFR in private ops. That makes no sense to me.
I have to have a passenger warning that says my experimental doesn’t comply with the same safety standards as “normal passenger commercial flight”
Does the average passenger think that the sea world scenic is a “normal passenger commercial flight” (their interpretation- not CASAs) and has the same level of safety thereof?