Originally Posted by
Mikehotel152
In my experience, including training dozens of pilots doing their command courses, the problem is not necessarily commanders not having the willingness to upload sufficient fuel to cover known contingencies. Instead , it is the failure of many pilots who fly hundreds of sectors a year to properly make a plan to deal with a diversion once it becomes necessary.
These are high pressure situations where thinking time is at a premium as fuel is burned at a great rate. One needs to have a clear plan that complies with the commander's legal responsibility at dispatch. A plan that ensures that pressing TOGA at DA sets into motion a set of predetermined actions which ensure a safe landing 'somewhere'.
Vague ideas such as 'extra fuel' and 'wife and kids' just ensure that people burn valuable time thinking and not acting. From the looks of things, this Zurich diversion was enacted with little wasted time. But I wonder what plan was made on the ground in the crew room.
I think that is the nub of it. It’s not how much you put on to begin with, it’s what you do when it’s running out, or you think it might run out later. Extra fuel often just delays the point at which serious decisions are going to have to be made, and in cases with long duty days, may make the destination unachievable after diversion.
I’m not against gassing up when you need it, but in my book it has to be for identifiable reasons, not just some illusory safety blanket. The incidents we are discussing are the 6-7 sigma, one-in-millions level occurrences where things went wrong (and kept going wrong)
but still came to a successful conclusion. If you’re happy with intersection takeoffs and thrust derates, flight plan fuel on the average day shouldn’t cause too many issues?