Thoughts on the decompression:
There is a rule in the FARs, 25.365, that lays out what decompression conditions that pressurized compartments have to be able to withstand.
There's a handy little formula in subsect (e) that, if my math is correct, and using a 12-ft fuselage diameter, works out to about 4 square feet. So basically all models of the 737 since probably 1980 should have been certified for a decompression with a hole size 4 ft^2. Alaska 1282 was clearly much bigger than this. That would explain why the cockpit door failed, it wasn't designed for the delta-p that 1282 saw.
Consequence #1: The airframe, particularly the floor structure, was overloaded. I won't be surprised if N704AL is out of service for some time while Boeing determines if the floor is still ok, and what reworks if any are needed. Probably all the interior will have to be replaced.
Consequence #2: The FAR says:
In complying with paragraph (e) of this section, the fail-safe features of the design may be considered in determining the probability of failure or penetration and probable size of openings, provided that possible improper operation of closure devices and inadvertent door openings are also considered.
I've worked on decompression before, and we never considered door blowouts because they are considered "extremely remote". For operable doors this is true, they never blow out because of their design features. For door plugs, we now know this isn't the case, so I won't be surprised if 1282 causes a round of rulemaking to address that. I wouldn't be shocked if in the future, the cockpit annunciators for door plugs are actualy hooked up to something.