Gee, it's like the 00's all over again.
Back to Iran (who may be complicit in the attacks vis a vis "Shiite Militias"): there as an interesting article I read over the weekend about "
While I am a little skeptical, the author argues that Iran didn't have any forewarning of the attack (in detail as regards time and place) and were thus on the back foot in terms of how to respond. In summary (article probably behind a paywall) :
First, the Islamic Republic of Iran cannot rally society to engage in a new war as it did during the war with Iraq in the 1980s.
Second, the moderate faction in the Iranian government has been warning against Iran’s direct intervention in the war. Indeed, the war in Gaza has deepened political cleavages in Tehran.
Third, Israel’s apparent failure in deterring Hamas’s attack on Oct. 7 does not alter Tehran’s strategic calculation toward Israel.
Fourth, contrary to the conventional wisdom, neither Hamas nor even Hezbollah is Iran’s proxy; it would be more accurate to think of them as Iran’s nonstate allies. There is no top-down relationship between Tehran and Hamas.
Fifth, Iran’s strategic partners in Moscow and Beijing have not declared their full support for Hamas.
Sixth, there exists a deep belief among influential decision-makers in Iran that the Arab sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf would welcome a large-scale war between Iran and Israel.
The last and the most significant factor influencing Iran’s apparent reluctance to engage in war is Khamenei’s specific point of view toward regional conflicts. Contrary to the mainstream view in the West, Iran’s supreme leader approaches responses to regional conflicts from a realist standpoint rather than an ideological one. Having served as the president of the Islamic Republic during the devastating war with Iraq, he is acutely aware of the consequences of war, especially with the U.S.
These seven interconnected reasons explain the Islamic Republic’s reluctance to involve itself in the war on behalf of Hamas.
None of this implies that Iran is willing to abandon Hamas, its strategic asset in Gaza. Rather than standing idly by, Tehran is likely to continue applying pressure on both Israel and the U.S.—through Hezbollah and its Shiite proxies in Iraq and Syria—without escalating the conflict to a full-scale regional war.
While the points were reasonably well supported, the Houthi active participation in trying to disrupt Israel related trade can hardly be viewed in isolation, given the depth of support and training that they receive from Iran.