Originally Posted by
wondering
Maybe, LH did a risk-benefit/risk mitigation analysis and concluded it is safer not to do visuals at night? Or, LH may not have the FAA OpSpecs for night visuals in the US? Personally, I find it difficult to judge distances to other traffic and terrain/obstacles at night. But maybe that´s just me.
Crossair 3597 comes to mind, as well. Technically not a visual approach but the crew followed visual cues at night.
But yeah the PM´s cocky attitude seems to have aggravated the problem. There was a female voice later on. No idea if it was the F/O or PIC initially. I reckon, it comes down to leadership and CRM to avoid putting yourself in a disadvantaged position. I am sure the incidence will be a case study for LH and a subject during future CRM trainings.
Croosair 3597 was having a guy in the LHS who wasn’t up to flying jets..iirc he was one of Moritz’s first pilots, had failed conversion onto the 146 twice and spent nearly 6 months line training before he passed his third shot not long before the accident..
Glad that I missed the red tape flying..we had final approach configuration selected by 400ft..stabilised by 300ft in practice and could “bend” the rules if we could demonstrate that it was “best use of équipement”. Those were the days where we understood airmanship.