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One of the typical malfunctions"; i.e. it is selected for training because it is available in the simulator, but not necessarily in proportion to the inservice risk.
If so then a safety issue is the possibility of biasing crew behaviour by choosing a rare event, and one where the frequency or simulated indications may not match the real world; e.g. takeoff vs cruise.
Defining risk as a threat severity x frequency; then practicing the malfunction at a higher frequency than reality generates a false sense of risk.
This was an issue way back in the days of PCM+ICR.
Refs: 'Indications of Propulsion System Malfunctions—Sustained Thrust Anomaly Study' 2007
https://www.tc.faa.gov/its/worldpac/techrpt/ar0615.pdf
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Currently, a propulsion system malfunction (PSM) occurs about once every 20,000 flights on Western-built commercial transport turbojet aircraft. Historically, on such aircraft, PSM plus inappropriate crew response (ICR) events number two to three per year in revenue service. From 1958 to 1995, a PSM+ICR event occurred about once every 4 million flights, and a fatal PSM+ICR event occurred about once every 26 million flights. The rate of occurrence per airplane departure for PSM+ICR accidents has remained essentially constant for many years. These accidents are still occurring despite the significant improvement in propulsion system reliability over the past 20 years, suggesting an increase in rate of ICR to propulsion system malfunction."
Overspeed malfunction #27, p2-35 , item 5 fig 2-17 p2-59, 60
Human Factors 4-15 …
'Indications of Propulsion System Malfunctions' 2004
https://www.tc.faa.gov/its/worldpac/techrpt/ar03-72.pdf N.B fig 4-8 and prob tables p3-36 …
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Only about 1% of powerloss/engine failure events involve failure to a high-thrust conditions" p4-29
PCM+ICR
https://skybrary.aero/sites/default/...shelf/1623.pdf 1998
Evidence Based Training ?
Evidence of improved skills in assessment and management, or evidence of events from the real world.