This follows the trend of many recent SIs. It's undoubtedly detailed and considers a multitude of factors, but as Sycamore says upthread, the correct engineering process or procedure for preventing aircraft operation with non-flight equipment fitted ("Red Gear" in this saga) has been available since the dawn of time. Segregating the Red Gear between each aircraft, meticulously recording fitment and removal of the complete set, and taking basic precautions to integrate complete sets (pussers string or black marker) would have prevented this and there is nothing new in any of those techniques. By filling the SI with all the distractions (or life on operations as we know it) it makes it seems like a really complex puzzle to solve, instead of saying "this was a basic but fundamental pre-flight task that was overlooked by everyone involved, resulting in the loss of the aircraft". I would also be interested to know how the security pressures versus flight safety argument played out. In this case, it looks like flight safety lost.