Originally Posted by BraceBrace;[url=tel:11464950
11464950[/url]]I do work for a nice company where the "training people" prefer to keep someone in training before "exposing" him to the world of "checks". It avoids a lot of problems in the long term. But I do would like to add, a company like Ryanair, where a lot of people like to bash the company itself, actually has a very nice training philosophy as well. It takes a lot to be kicked out of Ryanair...
Training goals are different. A captain has to be able to "run the show" smoothly whatever happens. That means also in tricky conditions (meteo, operational problems,...). If the captain does not have commercial jet experience, you will find yourself spending way too much time learning the basic "technicals" of flying a commercial jet. And then training becomes pretty "heavy loaded".
As an F/O non type rated the training goals are fairly easy, and overall "technical" (application of SOPs, and learning to fly a heavy jet). It doesn't really matter what your background is, the training programs and time available are designed to go from "0" to qualified F/O. So if you have "in-house" F/O's with enough "technical" experience, it's a lot easier to upgrade those guys and force the turboprop captains to apply for right seat F/O position.
But on a personal note I will admit I don't like people with only turboprop experience to go straight to heavy widebodies on a long haul network (F/O seat) for the same reason.
I think this thread focuses too much on what some companies like to distinguish as "junior" F/O's and "senior" F/O's. If the goal is to hire "junior" F/O's, you can have 2000hrs commercial jet, you will follow a "junior" F/O training syllabus. And that hardly has anything to do with nepotism.
I took that final report from airbaltic thread.
Initial Type Rating on September 2020, when most of the already type rated pilots where sent home.
How do you explain that?
During the investigation the pilot training records were scrutinized to reveal potential gaps in the pilot training and checking process. The available information about the training process of the pilot involved in the serious incident reveals that the pilot had the Type Rating Training Course (Initial training) for the aircraft type BD-500 (A220) from September 1 till November 26, 2020. The course training records reveal some deficiencies of the pilot’s flight skills: incorrect manipulation with the sidestick, pumping of the rudder for the directional control, untimely and inadequate rudder pedals input to ensure directional control, unnecessary application of brakes, etc. In the first Latvian CAA Skill test and proficiency check after the Rating Training Course the pilot failed due to “Insufficient skills. Lack of time.” After the additional training the test was passed. In 2021, the pilot had further Flight Trainings. The Flight Training Records contain remarks of the flight instructors, namely, periodical uncertainty in command of the aircraft and crew and lack of exchange of flight information with the pilot-monitoring [FO] when flying manually. The investigation has analysed the all available (provided) information about the training process of the pilot involved in the serious incident and suggests that there are potential gaps in the company pilots’ selection, training and checking programs, as well as in the information exchange and analysis by the airline's training department. The investigation has no access to the information on how the operator collects and analyses the information gathered during the training process.
There is a possibility that the pilot with obvious deficiencies during the training and checking period was authorized for line operations without having additional training or another means of mitigation to minimize potential risks. A similar situation with incorrect pilot actions during the landing in crosswind and gusty conditions occurred on June 21, 2018 at the Riga International airport with the airBaltic aircraft A200-300, registration number YL-CSC [Final Report No 4-02/1-18(4-19)]. The FDR data of the involved aircraft showed the application of the right rudder pedal with a simultaneous increase of the left brake pedal application. The higher brake force application on the left-hand side main gear wheels caused the aircraft deviation to the left with a subsequent aircraft side skid. The investigation of this serious incident concluded, that the Root cause of the incident [21/06/2018] was related with uncoordinated asymmetric actions of the flight crew in controlling of the aircraft during the landing. Analysing the actions of the airline pilots in both situations, the investigators can assume that the repeated cause of the incidents was the improper handling of the aircraft by the crews to counteract crosswind conditions. It is likely possible that the airline pilot training program has not been updated considering possible deficiencies and the previous incident.