vilas, re 'It is not ROPS in Boeing …'
'It' refers to technical systems, significantly different between Boeing and Airbus.
RAAS as fitted to EK was a reactive system, alerting to a specific distance gone, not that remaining - as per CB DtA above. RAAS is a reactive, advisory system which with ridged SOPS can be ambiguous because 'the correct decision' (after the event), changes with the situation.
RAAS has no specific situational knowledge
Alternatively, ROPS, both functionally and operationally supports the crew with less ambiguity. ROPS has predictive - anticipatory capacity originating from information available from the FMS and crew input. The calculations have the same basis as the crew's pre-landing distance assessment.
SOPs based on ROPS will be more consistent as they relate to the actual situation.
https://www.icao.int/SAM/Documents/2...nting%20RE.pdf
ROPS page 46
Also see preceding sections on crosswind - a feature at Funchal, and TOGA logic and selection vs Boeing's 777 system which contributed to the EK acccident.
https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/hajf7m9wfrv1xzsxcjw5s/ROPS-Frank-Chapman.pdf?rlkey=e9f4lkalxqipek1wunix9qpr1&dl=
page 20
n.b. Alerting, call-outs, displays; and quick landing assessment for all runway conditions - situation awareness.
https://slideplayer.com/slide/10912942/
n.b. 'What the pilot sees - what ROPS sees', slide 15
'Small deviations can have a large impact.' slide 8
Need for understanding slide 17
https://aircraft.airbus.com/sites/g/...bus-FAST55.pdf
page 12
.