Originally Posted by
Lookleft
''Some are saying because they got away with it no damage done. The discussion should be around why the landing was persisted with in the first place.
Why would a crew ignore all the red flags for a runway excursion and "press on" to an uncertain outcome.
Is it training, standards or are there lots of pilots out there who would have done exactly the same thing in the same circumstances?''
The reading of the CVR readout of the TAP 425 B727-282 CS-TBR accident (overrun) in Nov 1977 is a sobering and sad document, and that 'We Must Get it in' mode cost the lives of 125 passengers and 6 crew members.
Shortly before 10pm on that Saturday evening, after 13 hours and 15 minutes of crew hours duty time, the very tired crew was trying to land their 727 on the difficult Madeira airport runway, which at the time was just 1,600 m (5,250 ft) long.
The first attempt to approach the runway had to be aborted because the crew was unable to establish visual contact with the runway. A second attempt was made, but again, had to be discontinued due to the poor visibility.
The Captain João Lontrão and Co-pilot Miguel Guimarães Leal decided to make one last try to land the plane before they would have to make the decision to divert to the Gando Gran Canaria Airport in the Canary Islands (Seems the nearer airport on the island of Porto Santo was not the Alternate)
While descending now to runway 24 on an NDB approach, the crew still encountered poor weather conditions with limited visibility to 3 km, clouds down to 1,500 feet with heavy rain showers.
A few minutes later, on the third attempt to land at a speed of Vref + 19 knots, the crew landed with too long a flare, and touched down too far down on runway 24, about 2,060 feet past the runway threshold (Runway 24 is 5,000 feet long) at a speed of 148 knots.
Immediately after touchdown, the crew activated the thrust reversers and deployed the spoilers but were unable to stop on the wet runway, and the 727 overran at 48 knots. It went down a steep embankment, collided with a stone bridge, broke into several pieces and eventually came to rest in flames on the beach located about 40 meters below airfield elevation.
The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire.
Six crew members and 125 passengers were killed while 33 other occupants were seriously injured.
The investigation found lacking at Madeira Airport and had insufficient lights, making it difficult to perform an Approach.
Apart from the severe weather conditions at the time of landing, investigators looked at the crew’s Approach procedure. The accident report concluded that the crew touched down 1,060 feet (320 m) farther down the runway than they were meant to, at a speed that was 19.2 knots greater than recommended.
This, paired with the wet runway conditions that led to aquaplaning, sent TAP Flight 425 to its ultimate end.
In the wake of the accident, TAP replaced using its Boeing 727-28s with 727-82s on the route to Madeira.
This shorter variant, carried 60 fewer passengers – and was more suitable for landing on the short FNC runway, on which it had previously been operating from 1967, prior to the bigger 727-282 version delivered to TAP in 1975.
The airfield, originally known as Santa Catarina, had the 1600m runway, but the rest of the airport facilities were initially rather basic.
The first aircraft to arrive at the newly completed airport on Madeira was a TAP - Transportes Aéreos Portugueses Lockheed L-1049 Super Constellation, carrying 80 passengers on July 18, 1964.
A new passenger Terminal capable of handling 500,000 travellers per year opened in 1972 but local geography limited the length of the airstrip and growth was sluggish.
Funchal (FNC) soon gained a reputation as one of the most hazardous airfields in the world – due in part to its short runway but also because winds came off the sea and up the mountainside on which the airfield was constructed, as well as down nearby valleys.
The TAP 727 crash also spurred officials to look at extending the runway.
Construction for a (200-metre) extension began in 1983.
It took almost ten years, but in 1986 a 656ft (200m) extension was completed on the only remaining piece of flat land at the end of the airfield.
But it was still rather short for the then upcoming generation of new jets, and research set out to establish whether further lengthening might be possible and how it could be done.
The main alternate for Funchal is Porto Santo Airport (PXO), 60 miles (100km) and just a few minutes’ flying time across the archipelago. It has a 9,843ft (3,000m) runway but only six parking positions for airliners – 19 is the maximum that FNC can accommodate today, so PXO can get full quickly during periods of adverse weather.
If a diversion to PXO is not possible the Canary Islands are around 250 miles (400km) to the south,
Agadir and Casablanca, Morocco are both around 500 miles (800 km) to the east, and Lisbon 600 miles (965 km) to the northwest.
Each airline has its own procedures and nominates its own alternates.
Jeppesen chart for Madeira --- NOT up to date
Wind is not the only ‘gotcha’ though.
Poor visibility can be a problem, especially when the cloud base is low or easterly winds drag sand dust off the Sahara.