There have been several references to TDZ, but AFAIR this relates to runway markings and not aircraft landing performance. Similarly 'margins'; what margin - distance, how is this established and how judged in actual operation. Landing performance is based on a calculated (assumed) touchdown position, together with an assumed spread of normal performance, but what is normal.
Overrun events are relatively rare, but how many near-miss are there, how are these judged.
Academic views discuss press-on-itis as a feeling of being in control, biased by prior experienced or the progress of this event - as understood by the crew - their point of view - of being in control.
Other academics note that we tend not to learn from near misses - the outcomes were 'safe', we lack ability to judge the margins of safety; we choose not to learn because 'we would not have done that', but how do we know.
The roles of monitoring (self and crew) and alerting, are issues of CRM; these are repeatedly cited in accident reports - more training. Yet does the industry consider, learn, and accept that these concepts are limited, and perhaps as in this incident the humans were 'max out'. We might never know.
Does this crew know; only by reflection, which is subject to hindsight bias, as are most posted comments and opinion in this thread (note to self).