Originally Posted by
Diff Tail Shim
Burgess jet was signed for. The Servicing instruction didn't mention the aileron control linkage disconnect I believe but it was a norm to do so as it made the task of removing the component required for the NDT check. A violation in itself of the maintenance procedure but one known about as a simple workaround to ease the task. Well known on the rigger trade desk. Violation compounded by lack of paperwork raised for what automatically was an independent creating action. Not the last time I have heard it happen. Mike Seares failed a Jaguar on an air test post second line maintenance. Yaw trimming was impossible to be stable and was getting worse. Before towing to the hangar, the liney stuck on the EHP to charge the brake accumulator and the rudder deflected full one way by itself. The input rod to the PFCU had been found not pinned, nut not on the bolt and the bolt had fallen out. No paperwork trail to that item (even though it was part of a 2988 entry for the comprehensive yaw checks and should have been raised as a disconnect). No proof on whom of the several riggers could have removed it and no one was man enough to own up.
Your stories of these engineering failures are shocking, and one has to wonder how many others there are. Certainly, as Dervish and tucumseh point out, they have commonality with Sean Cunningham's tragic accident. If disturbed systems checking had been carried out (as mandated) then the overtightened shackle pin would have been discovered, the still disconnected aileron controls would have been discovered, the unpinned and unfastened PFCU rod would have been discovered, and two lives (with potentially a third) saved. These accidents share common causes; unprofessional practice both in supervision and execution. The Mk10 Hawk seats were sabotaged by an illegal order from Group to carry out work that should have happened in a (absent) seat bay, and certainly not on the line, so that shackle release could be demonstrated, as has been the mandated procedure for every such MBL seat from and including the Mk2.
Such were the horror stories that underpinned Flight Safety training in the 60s, disconnected ailerons and NRVs that could be connected back to front were to be a thing of the past. No more these days it would seem. Instead we are told that military flying is inherently dangerous, so get over it Princess! It would seem it is still not yet dangerous enough. The RAF/MOD has a default incentive to stove pipe its aircraft accidents, emphasising how unique each one is. Rather it should be looking for common causes, to training, supervision, and above all the continual provision and full monitoring of airworthiness. Instead whole fleets have had to be grounded because airworthiness (if they were ever indeed airworthy) has been lost and cannot be regained. That the final safety system, the ejector seat, be rendered unairworthy too is the greatest scandal of all. We must have reform of Military Air Regulation and Accident Investigation. They must be made independent of the MOD and of each other. Until they are, needless airworthiness related fatal air accidents will continue with the resultant avoidable loss in blood and treasure involved.