Returning to the original subject of this thread, the fatal crash of G-BXBU, a Mudry Cap 10B, I was shocked to read the Accident Report.
https://assets.publishing.service.go...BXBU_06-23.pdf
The Air Traffic Controllers gave the poor pilot no help at all. In fact they made things worse for him, by diverting him to Exeter airport, where weather conditions were completely unsuitable for a VFR landing. This was what the pilot needed, as he was licensed only for single-engine VFR flying, and was stuck above thick clouds at 7500 feet.
The diversion was agreed between two "assistants" at Exeter Airport and the Distress & Diversion Cell at Swanick, without a real Controller ever being involved. The pilot had called PAN PAN twice, and was heard by both Control centers, and set his beacon to Squawk 7700. It is confirmed in the Report that any one of these actions should have caused ATC to treat his situation as an Emergency. But the Exeter controller repeatedly referred to G-BXBU as a "weather diversion", then offered an ILS approach !! The controller seemed more concerned that G-BXBU should not conflict with a military jet that was circling, but in no distress at all.
No controller ever asked the pilot exactly what his problem was, or established that he had 90 mins of fuel left, so he could divert to several open airports.
Finally, the Exeter controller instructed G-BXBU to descend to 2600 feet, which was in thick cloud. The pilot queried this, and the instruction was repeated. The crash followed shortly thereafter. However, it is not possible to say that the instruction caused the crash, as there is some evidence that the pilot had already started to divert to another small airstrip, that was his home base.
Look, it must be said that this pilot was performing very poorly under extreme pressure (from his assessment) and he might very well have crashed anyway. Amongst other things, he had been flying with his beacon Off, and had already made several lurid abrupt 360 degree turns, and rapid descents. And he did not communicate very clearly with ATC. He was clearly panicking. But with even average support from ATC, he might have survived, with his passenger.
The seven Safety Recommendations in the report all relate to ATC in one form or another. There are none for pilots.
I imagine that all pilots would expect that ATC could respond correctly to a call of PAN PAN, and a beacon setting of 7700. Surely ATC must have some statutory responsibilities?
Altogether a very disappointing incident.
IB