Originally Posted by
Asturias56
So it wasn't just "technology for technology's sake" TD?
because that's what it looks like from the outside
Some of it might be. The USAF spec'ed a remote vision system (the refueler stations are right behind the flight deck). It occurs to me that access to the traditional tail station could be limited if there were cargo pallets in the hold, but I don't know if being able to refuel while carrying a large cargo load was a consideration.
I do know the KC-46 doesn't use the same boom system as the KC-767 does - and the USAF didn't want the legacy system that the KC-767 uses.
The KC-767 had it's fair share of issues - but the expectation was there would be lessons learned to keep similar issues from occurring on the KC-46. Instead the KC-46 had some of the same issues, plus many, many new ones.
Repeating myself here, but many of the issues with the KC-46 trace back to sloppy management - for example many systems did not implement the required wiring separation (e.g. battle damage protection). Yet in Propulsion we knew all about the requirement and designed for it (tricky, because there are limited places to route wiring on the wing and wing/body joint) - so why did so many other systems neglect that requirement resulting in massively expensive rework? Piss poor management IMHO. Most of the KC-46 managers came from the 787 - and brought along the same flawed management techniques that messed up that program so badly. Too much emphasis on process, not enough emphasis on outcome (i.e. product). Some people can't seem to learn from their own mistakes...
There were other issues that seem to defy explanation - for example they designed a new fuel system manifold that leaked like a sieve - to fix it they had to start over from scratch. How can a company that's been successfully building large aircraft for 80 years suddenly be unable to design a fuel manifold that doesn't leak?