Originally Posted by
MechEngr
Bbtengineer,
Are you satisfied that there was a false stall warning and that the AoA system reported false information?
Satisfied that the major errors in ET-302 happened primarily because of that false stall warning and prior to MCAS activation?
What other sensors should be allowed to lie? Fuel amount? Radalt? Engine fire?
I have been looking at the whole system. I agree - it was the failure to do so that got people killed.
You are looking at a piece of software that acted exactly as it was specified to act. It would have saved AF 447 is Airbus had installed a similar system.
In contrast, the AoA sensor didn't report the correct AoA and the related control subsystems all acted as if it did. All of them relied on the false AoA information, including the autopilot, which bugged out because of the false AoA sensor reading.
The software had faulty inputs.
I would expect a software engineer to anticipate faulty inputs, and to figure out how to detect them and deal with them.
Apparently they did neither.
In what universe was a totally unconstrained application of AND ever going to be appropriate?
It obviously didn’t work and I can’t quite actually believe we’re discussing a hypothesis that it did.