Did FDX fly with visual seperation from SWA in fog?
SLF. Comments from someone who usually occupies seat 30C:
1) I agree we need to be slow on apportioning blame, but like ACA at LAX this is almost all on ATC.
2) SWA "ready to go," nothing of note here. We could pillory the FAA for not having ground radar. It may have helped the gamer generation better with situational awareness, but then we're back here again with it goes out - for which I'm sure we could pillory the FAA for yet again. SWA, nothing of note.
3) SWA, traffic at a 3 mile final, _heavy_, with negligible visibility, WTF. SWA gets all the residual apportionment here. On a clear day or even night this might get some debate from the gallery, but I'd be firmly in the give it a go camp. I'm the SLF that counts headlights making the turn onto the runway at ATL. (and yes, I know, parallel ops.) But with no real visibility, this is an indicator of poor SA from SWA. How long were they on frequency, did they hear the initial call from FDX? Did they hear it or did they hear it? I could say the same on the takeoff clearance, copy traffic.
4) FDX's decision to continue the approach, recalling SWA landing at ATL with too close a departure, "That's not going to work" which I recall was at a 2NM final flying CAVOK. Or the commuter jet at LEX that lost situational awareness on the ground in similar weather to this incident with another aircraft waiting to use the runway who made the correct decision to wait out the wayward jet, despite ATC insisting it was safe. To be fair to FDX, unlike SWA, was in the middle of flying a CAT III approach whereas SWA was "parked" at the hold bar and could succeed by _doing_literally_nothing.
5) FDX suggesting SWA abort, a prudent call. They were at least trying to generate a solution that ATC didn't know they needed. SWA's decision to continue is not one I want to impinge on. Could FDX have said more? Were SWA still below 40kt? Were they near enough V1? Was the call a legitimate safety call? Comments from the real pilots?
6) A 767 on a go around on top of a 737 taking off is not something I enjoy reading about. My dad lost a coworker in 91 at LAX.
7) All this nonsense on Cat III is going to be a red herring. I'd acknowledge ___ for noting the ONE CAT III hold bar at AUS, on the far side of the runway from the passenger terminal.
8) CVR, again the only thing this may provide is a detail on the discussions from SWA in the 60 seconds taking the runway and FDX in continuing the approach. As everyone walked away and this is going to be almost all on ATC, I don't think we're at risk of a loss of value such as with ACA at SFO. Would we like to see it, it could help with added insight.
9) FDX, "on the go", given the critically reduced separation did they not want to clog the radio with too much traffic? Any comments from seat 0A regarding phraseology, touch and go phraseology? If you could only make a limited number of radio transmissions what/when would you make a call? And as someone else suggested, were they aviating?
My impression is we are down to luck. I'd be hopeful someone, FDX, did a sidestep, but was there coordination. There were no real RTs, but an extended CVR would have or pilot recollection could help with TCAS. Were they close enough that they reverted to visual separation? A comment that seems almost absurd given the weather, but for the fact that they possibly could have and be believed is even more absurd.