There are quite a few misconceptions and areas of misunderstanding on this thread that should probably be cleared up…
What stands out to me is the usual ‘facts based’ USN mishap report that completely fails to answer the question of how the pilot got himself into an unrecoverable situation. By glossing over that, this report offers little than a summary of what happened with a few recommendations that will hopefully prevent a crash when the next guy or girl screws it up. However, no effort is made to prevent future screw ups - simply the consequences.
Before I receive a barrage of incoming spears, I will start out by stating that I am 100% guilty of participating in this activity in a previous life. I’ve seen ‘expedited recoveries’ performed excellently and safely. I have also seen more than 1 pilot almost fly into the ocean attempting them. I’ve seen countless over-stresses of F18s doing this and plenty of requirements to wave off unsafe SHBs.
To start we should move away from the terminology of ‘expedited break’ or Sierra Hotel Break - it was a ***** hot break. Period. The intent was to demonstrate ability / Naval Aviator ‘spirit’ / bring morale to those watching. Very happy for someone to tell me the risks inherent in a SHB are worth saving approximately 30s during a deck recovery cycle. Additionally, in order to execute a SHB you need to generate more of a gap between you and your interval - you can achieve the exact same timing by just executing a normal break behind the aircraft ahead of you in the pattern. Finally, if you are ‘breaking the deck’ ie. the first aircraft to land in a given cycle, you aim for the deck to go green and ready for your recovery as you enter the groove. The time spent in the pattern, getting to the point in space, is irrelevant.
So how does one fly a SHB? Great question as it’s not published. It is not a standard procedure that a pilot is taught at any point in training or when in the fleet. Is it commonplace? - absolutely. But the first time you ‘attempt’ the SHB you are on a voyage of discovery guided only by the ‘gouge’ / techniques passed informally to you by your peers. What could go wrong? What we are talking about is normalisation of deviance. CV NATOPS states how you should fly the pattern and offers no alternative guidance. Fly the SHB and you are saying “noted, but I’m going to ignore that and try something else”. Again, before you come at me, baying for blood - I’ve ignored CV NATOPS and ripped it off at 7g aft of the ship in Max AB.
Why Afterburner in the break? Because it looks and sounds cool to the audience watching on the deck. Period. Why didn’t he wave off when he thought he was off parameters? Because pilots ‘shall not’ take their own wave offs in the groove - this is the job of the LSOs. Very happy to explain why another time. Why did he fail to complete his 4 item landing checklist? Because he was task saturated in a 7g, ~600ft, max performance turn whilst looking over his shoulder at the flight deck whilst panicking on how an earth he was going to slow his F35 down. I sympathise - I’ve been there.
SHBs are informally encouraged in the fleet. LSOs used to give automatic upgrades to your landing grade if you flew a safe SHB, regardless of being off parameters that would guarantee you a poor grade had you been flying a normal pattern. Do something unsafe however and all bets are off.
So to finish with something constructive. If the USN want to avoid this happening again by addressing the route cause they have two options:
- Prohibit SHBs. Tricky one as it’s a grey line on what is / what isn’t and I agree with the board’s rationale on why a blanket ban creates additional problems.
- Write a procedure on how to fly a SHB and like everything else you do in naval aviation, train to it. This would be my recommendation for what it’s worth (absolutely nothing).
Finally thoughts to the 5 crew members who were seriously injured by this, 3 of which whom required immediate MEDIVAC. I do sympathise with the pilot but you have little defence when consciously decide to deviate from your trained standards and attempt something you’ve never done before, that has not formalised execution standards.