Whow, what lots of very emotional comments here , are you sure you are really all white males ?
Disagree completely wiith some recent comments made but on thing I would agree with
punkalouver , yes time to close this .. I will happily contribute to another thread on equity and gender equality if one wants to open one. But looks like I will not convince you and based on what I read so far looks like you're unlikely to convince me .
So back to Austin .
Do you really believe , as I see some of you suggesting , that it was 100% the fault of the controller, and that the case is clear and there is nothing more to learn? The controller was : a) substandard, b) black and had played the race card to get transferred to Austin, Texas ( of all places !) and c) had only been recruited and allowed to continue to work because of a minority preferred quota system ? Case closed , we continue as before no need to cage anything . .
Most of the points against the controller are apparently coming from the point65 web site , which is a site made for FAA employees to vent their frustration at the FAA. The language (and the grammar) used by some posters show clearly some education deficiencies .
Now to put back the discussion on the technicalities based on what we know from the FR24 and the partial audio recordings of the R/T : which I can resume :
The controller cleared a SW 737 to line up and take off with a 767 3 NM out, indicating to teh SW traffic was 3 NM but without mentioning the word “ expedite” . Errors? Oh yes .
But the SW did acknowledged the clearance , was aware of the 3NM distance, (he replied “ copied the traffic” ) yet took 45-50 seconds ( eaxacttimig to be checked) ) before starting the take off roll . No problem there ?
The Fedex did recognize the issue, asked the controller if he was still clear to land , but in fact meaning : is the runway clear ?”
The controller asked the SW if it had started his roll , instead of asking , are you airborne yet ?
SW replied ‘rolling now ” but that did not clarify anything as it could be just started or at close to Vr.. The controller did not verify .
The controller should have initiated a go around to the Fedex. . Did not .
The FedEx then decided to initiate the go around, used his own abbreviation for it and took the initiative to ask the SW to abort without identifying himself, which led the controller to believe the transmission was coming from the SW, and cleared the SW to take the first exit right when able, to which the SW replied “ negative” but not indicating he was airborne.by then.
The FedEx performed a go around right on top of the 737 without side stepping causing the 2 aircraft to come within 100-150ft vertically .( actual miss distance still to be verified)
The controller did not intervene to try to separate the 2 aircraft above the runway. But was he aware of the situation ? No visual, no ground radar.
No if you still think the controller is the only one that f..ked up here and that the procedures, lack of standard phraseology, your “freedom” etc…you are going to wake up with a big hangover very soon.
For me , looking at this from a purely ATC incident investigation : the first question I will ask is : was the controller working alone ? if yes who was supervising him ? the second was the airport officially declared under LVP , (or SMGCS Plan as you call it ) ? In other words was the SW and the Controller aware ? the fedex seems to have been under that impression as he asked for CAT III APP.
Then is lining up at 3 Nm normal in AUS, ( in Europe some airports are doing it until 2,5 with “expedite” in good Wx conditions ) and mostly why is all this non-standard phraseology used ? local Austin or general US problem ?
So yes, a lot to learn for me from this incident. Putting the whole blame on the controller is the easy way out and the excuse not to change anything. In fact this is exactly how we classified things 30 years ago when everything was “ pilot error” to avoid touching the system .