How about this for an exercise.....forget all the Gucci kit available to assist in the landing of a jet on a carrier.....let's focus on the straight forward basic airmanship that occurred.
Answer the question.....at what point did the MP's effort to land that F-35 on the Carrier begin to go wrong?
Was it initial entry airspeed, height, combination of both, the addition of After Burner in the initial break, radius of turn in the initial break, and right on down the line to the point he realized it was time to eject leaving his aircraft to crash onto the carrier?
At which point would one think a Go Around Decision should have been made?
Why did he wait so long to see the Accident Chain materialize in front of his eyes?
Why did he not realize he had goofed it up to the degree that abandoning the Landing was necessary and appropriate?
He is quoted as saying he did not feel any pressure by Command or other sources that might have influenced his thinking....but does not the Navy system not do that even if it is not intentional?
Some experienced Navy Jet Pilots have suggested what some of the answers might be.
High, fast, and above the Glide Slope is a tough situation to correct in a sleek low drag Jet. just as it is in any aircraft when landing.
Are we not taught that the secret to a good landing. is a good approach to that landing.
At what point did the MP realize his approach was "unstable" or did he not ever realize that until the LSO called Wave Off at almost the same instant that the Pilot was ejecting?
The real question os "why" the very late realization it was not going to end well.