PPRuNe Forums - View Single Post - Pilot Error After ‘Sierra Hotel [SH-T HOT] Break’ F-35C Crash
Old 23rd Feb 2023, 15:20
  #41 (permalink)  
Not_a_boffin
 
Join Date: Apr 2006
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Originally Posted by SASless
At what point in the approach did the aircraft sink below the Glide Slope and the Pilot and LSO's detect the aircraft was not correcting that deviation?

Check the video timeline and see how little time exists between that determination and the time the Pilot ejected and the time it took for the aircraft to strike the Ramp.

That suggests the demand for additional power came late in the approach remembering the Throttle was in Manual thus the Computer flying the aircraft had a constant power setting right to that point.

We call it Pilot Error....but a lot of things happened to set him up for failure.

As the Pilot he has the final repsonsibility not the LSO's although one can argue the LSO's have ultimate authority if they issue a Wave Off command.

Did the Pilot advance the Throttle at all before ejecting.....or did he not have the time to do do?

We know Navy Carrier Pilots receive training about the importance of making a Ejection decision when things go wrong as even with modern Seats delay can fatal.
The narrative timeline has 11 seconds between entering the groove and the ramp strike. At some time in the first six seconds according to the narrative, the pilot realised he was off glideslope and sinking and advanced the throttle (although the flight data part of the narrative also suggests that he only advanced the throttle two seconds before the ramp strike). At the groove plus six seconds point, the LSO made first call for power, followed by a wave-off one second later. Four seconds later, the aircraft hit the ramp and the pilot ejected.

So the pilot got into the groove with throttle at idle and for whatever reason failed to notice - SA again - until too late. The fact it's a very short approach doesn't help, which is why some form of visual / aural alert to the LSO that (as per gear and hook) the aircraft is in the correct mode for recovery would have helped. That extra six seconds between entering the groove and the first LSO power-call might have resulted in a successful wave-off. That's why they have that authority.

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