Originally Posted by
soarbum
I hope that Boeing will be forced to give a reponse in this court case as to why they felt that MCAS system on the MAX needed to be given the authority to override the pilot.
The 737NG had column cutout* switches to ensure that it there could be no nose down trip from either the pickle switches or the automated systems if the pilot had the column pulled back.
Also on the 737NG, the pilots had options either to disable just trim inputs from the automation or all trip inputs but this was taken away on the MAX.
If either of these two safety mechanisms had been left in place, the outcomes of the two accidents may have been different.
If Boeing were so interested in minimizing changes (pilot training) between the NG and the MAX, what were the underlying engineering/aerodynamic drivers that made them feel that MCAS needed to have the power to overrule those safetys.
To avoid confusion of technical terms, I looked up in an Manual (non-Boeing) of 737
NG
Stabilizer trim switches on each control wheel, those rocker switches for pilot elec trim control
Control column actuated stabilizer trim cutout switches stop operation of the main electric and autopilot trim when the control column movement opposes trim direction
On Aft Electronic Panel:
Stabilizer Trim Override Switch In Position OVERRIDE – Bypasses the control column actuated stabilizer trim cutout switches to restore power to the stabilizer trim switches.
On Control Stand:
Stabilizer Trim Main Electric (MAIN ELECT) Cutout Switch - CUTOUT – Deactivates stabilizer trim switch operation.
Stabilizer Trim AUTOPILOT Cutout Switch - NORMAL – Normal operating position. CUTOUT – · Deactivates autopilot stabilizer trim operation. · Autopilot disengages if engaged.
