Originally Posted by
soarbum
I hope that Boeing will be forced to give a reponse in this court case as to why they felt that MCAS system on the MAX needed to be given the authority to override the pilot.
The 737NG had column cutout* switches to ensure that it there could be no nose down trip from either the pickle switches or the automated systems if the pilot had the column pulled back.
Also on the 737NG, the pilots had options either to disable just trim inputs from the automation or all trip inputs but this was taken away on the MAX.
If either of these two safety mechanisms had been left in place, the outcomes of the two accidents may have been different.
If Boeing were so interested in minimizing changes (pilot training) between the NG and the MAX, what were the underlying engineering/aerodynamic drivers that made them feel that MCAS needed to have the power to overrule those safetys.
Because MCAS provides a correction opposite to the manual inputs from a pilot. If the plane is heading towards a stall because the pilot is hauling back on the wheel, then having MCAS cutout when the pilot hauls back on the wheel defeats the purpose of MCAS.
Even on the previous generation cutting both systems was recommended as trim runaway is so rapid in making the situation bad that pilots have no time to figure out if the automation has failed or there is a loose piece of wire short circuiting the trim switch.