Originally Posted by
MechEngr
Since the ET302 crew failure started before MCAS was involved, it's not a simply a problem of failing to have a clear picture of a technical memo.
Well, they may have made "mistakes" (though is it really a mistake to not know what to do when the instruments give conflicting information -including, but not only, over speed + stall- when the check-lists and training does not cover these items ?), though the aircraft only became unflyable, once the MCASS started acting.
Only when the not-documented secret button was pushed, the MCAS effects could be compensated for. In the pre-Indonesian crash, only the (experienced ?) engineer, monitoring the situation, managed to get to that stage.
So, yeah, for now, there are no reasons to assume, this crew would not have managed to get the MAX on the ground in one piece, with all participants in this MAX/MCAS experiment walking away unharmed, if the MCAS had been stayed at rest.