That’s the thing that people still aren’t understanding. The external contractors aren’t “explaining how our own system works”, we’re telling them how it works and they are building the RAF a system to help track and manage it all.
How did we do it in the past? Chaos and sheer volume of numbers. That’s the snag, as we got smaller then relying on that means that we need to be more measured as there isn’t any fat in a system that trains such small numbers and a demand to cut out waste/overlap. That is also the other snag in the constant demands to return flying training completely to Service control - even if we had the money, we wouldn’t have the people (Aircrew and Engineers) to do it in house. It would take 5-10 years to train up the volume of people to spring the more experienced folks to be the instructors. It’s easy to axe fleets and people, but hellishly expensive and time consuming to build back up again.
That’s the thing too, the RAF has been shrinking since the end of WW2. It’s easy to manage a system when you have excess numbers to rely upon. The wheels really came off the wagon in SDSR10 when the RAF decided it had too many Pilots and sacked 170 students. Then did not recruit any for 3 years or so. Then for SDSR15 the RAF was asked to grow for the first time in about 70 years, and with a new flying training system that replaced just about every type save for Hawk T2 and Avenger in a 2-3 year period. Then you add the fact that the system was designed and catered for the reduced numbers of SDSR10 and you have a perfect storm brewing. Add to it all the complexities mentioned above, and the fidelity now needed due to the small numbers, then you get what we have right now.
Interestingly, the issue last summer was
nothing to do with UKMFTS and it was all about an inability to absorb the excess numbers being sent to be trained on the front line. That was a lot to do with COVID when far fewer left than planned and left students waiting a couple of years for an OCU. Couple that to highly successful rejoining program that also filled the front line and you get the picture. Which is why bold statements can be made by the higher-ups about “operational effectiveness not being affected” - because in a lot of areas it’s full! But then again, with small numbers, especially an all single-seat combat air force then losing a handful or 2 of Pilots in relatively short order can tip you quickly into desperate times again.
So we really can’t do it the way we used to - the current situation proves that!
