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Old 9th Jan 2023, 18:23
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MechEngr
 
Join Date: Oct 2019
Location: USA
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To revisit - Airbus decided to scale the movement of the rudder pedals with dynamic pressure - the 100% limit was applied at a smaller displacement of the pilot feet thereby preventing the pilot from understanding that change in scale until they hit the variable travel stops.

Under Airbus, it could be that 5% of the full pedal travel could be the 100% allowable per the dynamic pressure.

Boeing let the full allowed travel to be the full allowed travel of the pedals and scaled the motion of the rudder instead. So 100% pedal travel was always 100% allowable per the dynamic pressure.

The discovery process uncovered ten prior in-service events concerning A-300 aircraft,
beginning with an Interflug Airlines event in 1991. In all ten events, the vertical
stabilizers of each Airbus aircraft were exposed to excessive aerodynamic loads—three
even exceeding ultimate load (United States 2003 (Public Hearing Exhibit 7Q). When the
manufacturer observed these highly unusual in- flight events, Airbus should have
investigated the flaws in the design as the limit load is the maximum load expected when
the aircraft is in service.
https://web.archive.org/web/20160304...submission.pdf

also

This new system used a Variable Stop Actuator (VSA) which is also found in the
MD-80. The VSA also limited the amount of rudder available to the pilot. The difference
in this system is that the distance which the rudder pedals moved also decreased as the
rudder movement decreased in proportion to speed. A significant flaw in the design failed
to offer the same kind of protection as in the McDonnell design. The MD-80 limits
rudder travel and affords protection in the form of rudder “blow down” should an
operator demand more rudder travel (with resultant excessive load) than the structure can
withstand. These kinds of redundant system designs are common in commercial
aviation—a standard that should be addressed during certification. The Airbus Flight
Crew Operations Manual (FCOM) addresses the rudder system much like any other
manufacturer and, in fact, did not change the language of the FCOM even after changing
the A300 design from the VLA to the VSA system.
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