Originally Posted by
pasta
If the aircraft had been airworthy but all other circumstances been the same, would the incident still have happened, with the same results? In my view it probably would have done, so whilst the airworthiness issues are serious and warrant further action, I don't think you can say they were the root cause.
I think you need to look at it slightly differently. If the airworthiness regulations had been implemented correctly, the accident would not have happened because the aircraft would not have been flying. Ergo, that failure to implement is a root cause.
If, for example, the regulations had been implemented the pilot would have had an up-to-date set of Flight Reference Cards (not those from April 1974), the engineers would have had up-to-date tech pubs, and the fuel pump would have been serviceable. Perhaps the Master Airspeed Indicator and G-Meter would have been serviceable? Maybe the various missing instruments would have been fitted?
The CAA certification stated that the RAF was responsible for the underpinning process, with permission to fly predicated on this. They were not, AND NEVER HAVE BEEN, which is a complete howler. It has never been made clear who was. Some may opine that none of this had a direct bearing on the accident flight (I'm not so sure), but such gross failures are indicative of systemic and wider failings - which the AAIB report lists in excruciating detail. (Little wonder the pilot and Coroner wanted it read out in court, and the CAA did not). There's obviously someone in the loop who decided not to bother doing their job, or was told this mandate would be waived. And the CAA allowed this, with their mandated audit 7 months overdue.
Mr Hill admitted he screwed up, but couldn't explain it. Time for others to be equally honest. They don't need to explain, because we already know.