"What is not clear is the extent to which politicians in the 21st century want, or see a need for, a force capable of taking and holding ground abroad. There is little interest in fighting wars of conquest, and any major land war is likely to be fought under Article 5, and involve NATO partners and allies. .................. it comes down to whether politicians feel that they want to invest in keeping the UK as a credible ‘heavy’ power, or if they feel that their strategic goals can be delivered through other means.
In simple terms the decision they face is whether to invest more money in the Army to keep it able to fight in the most complex and intense threat environments, reducing resources for other areas given the likely cost of bringing large scale forces up to standard, or alternatively to step back from it. There may be an argument for a token brigade to deploy if needed on a short term mission, but what is the gain to the UK of being able to deploy and sustain a large ground force at distance from home for months at a time, compared to say peacekeeping operations?
This is not an argument against global deployments – ...................... It remains a globally focused organisation, and is one of the very few army’s out there able to deploy acclimatised reserves of troops with jungle, desert and arctic experience at pretty much the same time. It has global mobility and the ability to deploy on smaller raiding expeditions, training and working alongside peers, but the question has to be asked – what is the scale at which the Army needs to operate in future?
Similar questions will likely be asked of the RN and RAF too – for example, in a world where there is very limited appetite for interventions, and where being able to put a force ashore is complex and time consuming, is there really still a need for amphibious shipping? While it looks impressive, and can be occasionally helpful, does the UK really benefit or need a significant amphibious force, supported by the Royal Marines, given that it is highly unlikely that the UK will ever launch an amphibious operation at scale again? Has the time come to ask really difficult questions of sacred cows that perhaps need to be turned into BBQ?
It feels increasingly like the UK is facing a rerun of the 1980 ‘Nott Review’ and has a similar policy challenge. A resurgent and aggressive Russia, coupled with an unstable wider world, aspirations for global operations but a need to credibly support NATO on land, sea and air and an expensive and unaffordable equipment programme (as well as the affordability of Trident) means that tough choices are unavoidable. In 1980 the RN focused on the ASW ‘deep battle’ at the cost of intending to get out of the amphibious game – will history repeat itself?