Originally Posted by
Old_Slartibartfast
I know, which is why I keep pointing out that the FADEC code in question had been examined by the FAA and certified as being safe. It was absolutely no different to the process for certifying the FADEC code for the engines of all the thousands of aircraft flying around at this moment, carrying tens of thousands of passengers, as the FAA, EASA or whoever will have certified that software in the exact same way. It has nothing to do with the Chinook from more than a decade earlier, or any other aircraft come to that. The problem was that one person within one defence contractor, QQ, didn't like the idea of using certification from outside the UK. If it were the case that all US certification was unsafe then we would see dozens of aircraft falling out of the sky (and I accept that Boeing have continued to take short cuts with the 737 MAX). It was very much a "little Englander" view of the world, one I found pretty offensive, TBH.
QQ didn't even exist as a defence contractor at the time of the ZD576 accident, anyway. IIRC, QQ came into existence as a defence contractor around 2001. My understanding at the time (2004) was that there was no compulsion to use the services of QQ as a company, as long as airworthiness requirements could be certified by a recognised competent body. I left before that happened, but I believe the options being looked at were to either just use the FAA certification people, with an envelope extension over the civil use case, or get EASA to do it. Not sure which prevailed in the end.
Let's just take those one at a time. I suspect that the code for your project would have had to be updated for your engine/aircraft response and performance. If so, it required checking anyway no matter whose code it was and who had certified it previously. The fact that the engine was already in service in other aircraft in other countries would not alter that. You say yourself that EASA was in the process of certifying it for the EU. Why didn't they simply read across the FAA certification? They would have done whatever their Regulations required, so ditto the MAA. It was BD/QQ's duty to abide by the UK Military Airworthiness Regulations (ie the MAA's). In this case that meant a full audit of the FADEC code. If you (IPT?) had an issue with that then there would have been the means to challenge it, indeed the Project Director could have simply said that BD were wrong in their interpretation of the Regs and then seek top cover. All formally in writing of course, what Sir Humphrey would characterise as a 'Brave Decision!".
The Regs aren't there to be ignored or played with by irritated and impatient RAF VSOs. They are there to save lives (and aircraft) so that UK Air Power isn't frittered away in needless self-destruction by flying into hillsides, spontaneously blowing up following AAR, being shot down due blue on blue following IFF unflagged failure or simply due to an AK47 round, or suffering a mid-air due illegally fitted HISLs. The enemy was present in only one of those tragedies! Just about all of those fatal accidents can be traced to illegal orders by RAF VSOs. None of them can be traced back to the actions of one man at BD! You may interpret QQs actions in any way you wish. I interpret them as carrying out their contractual and legal obligations to observe the mandated regulations.
As to thousands of flights by tens of thousands of pax in hundreds of FAA certified aircraft using your engine and your FADEC (which I think is the point you are making), it is not up to BD to use their discretion. If they can "read across" they will, if not they won't. I worked for a UK airline that uniquely operated the B727 on the CAA register. Dai Jones (he of the 'Handling the Big Jets') insisted that a Stick Push be fitted due to the high tail plane (like the 1-11) even though it was certified by the FAA without one. The airline had to cough up before it was CAA certified. BD has always been a favourite RAF VSO Aunt Sally because it is mandated to do what the Regs say, not what the VSOs say. As to,
FWIW this had absolutely nothing at all to do with the blatant disregard for basic safety surrounding the RTS of the Chinook. The Chinook's many safety issues were fairly and squarely the fault of Boeing and Textron, and not in any way related to either Rolls Royce or Honeywell at the other end of the USA.
Again, where do we start? Both companies were involved in the pig's ear that was the Chinook HC2 it is true, but the bottom line is that what started out as a Mk1 mid-life upgrade became an unrealistic and undeliverable project at a time when the aircraft were needed airworthy and fit to fly operationally in NI. That the RAF got neither was the direct result of RAF VSO illegal orders and actions. It was ACAS who issued the illegal RTS, not Boeing, not Textron. It was AMSO who had set the ball rolling by implementing a policy of such monumental incompetence that spare parts that he disposed of had to be bought back at eye watering cost! Where to recover the lost money from? Why, the Air Safety budget of course, hitherto ring fenced and inviolate. Get rid of the turbulent engineers who insisted on observing the airworthiness regs as they were mandated to do. Replace them with blanket stackers and blunties who knew nothing of the regs which they would obligingly suborn as ordered. The results can be read in the many Airworthiness Related Fatal Accident threads that litter this forum. What has been the RAF Star Chamber's reaction to this scandal? Two-fold; pin the blame on anyone up to and including 1*, and keep the coverup protecting the RAF VSOs involved going (thus obstructing the urgent need to reform UK Military Airworthiness and Air Accident Investigation (both remaining as MOD subsidiaries, ie of the operator!).
Could I end by simply recommending to those who might consider the Mull tragedy to be just history to read David Hill's book Their Greatest Disgrace. Sure, it's about 1994, even the years leading up to it, but it is also about 2022 and the years ahead. The unairworthiness that infects our military airfleets still was made manifest then in that terrible day in June. The death toll was terrible, 29. The effect on UK security was terrible, for the 25 pax were the cream of the crop. The effect on the NoK was terrible, especially when RAF VSOs blamed the deceased pilots for the tragedy. The BoI was unsatisfactory having been 'groomed' and so showing little interest in the notorious operating issues that beset the HC2. The Reviewing Officers finding was mere vindictiveness and yet is still quoted by some RAF VSOs to this day as the 'truth' of the matter. Thankfully there was one man of honour at least, SoS Liam Fox, who overturned their finding and thus immediately raised the question, "If it wasn't pilot gross negligence that was the cause, then what was?". We shall never know, for a new BoI/SI would compromise the coverup and hence the reputations of the VSOs involved (of far more importance than those of mere JOs).
Oh, as to the OP, the above is what happens when RAF a/c are rushed into service contrary to the Regulations!