Originally Posted by
Asturias56
the actual cuts were made by politicians - and that is the issue.
In the context of the cuts Chug (and myself) speak of, that is not true.
The cuts were imposed by AMSO (RAF) to compensate for, and divert attention from, the astronomical waste caused by other wasteful policies, not least that of scrapping L and C class spares that were not actually fitted to aircraft, and insisting that repair turn round times of R class go from weeks to years. The Director of Flight Safety often criticised the effect this had on front line.
This policy was dubbed 'savings at the expense of safety', and it was confirmed (not uncovered) by Haddon-Cave. However, he dated it at 1998, not 1987, despite being given the promulgation notice and various supporting correspondence from June and November 1987. (The AMSO of the day used to post on here, and claimed the policy was promulgated by his successor in 1988). H-C exacerbated the lie by tying his 1998 date to the demise of the RAF Chief Engineer post, when in fact the Chief Engineer from 1991-96 was also Air Member Logistics (new name for AMSO) from 1994, under whom the waste/cuts were perpetuated at the rate of 25-28% a year. (Depending on domain). This was entirely separate from the concurrent, and more minor cuts under Options for Change; and, for example, the RN's Hallifax Savings of 1988. The 'political' cuts he mentioned were a mere 4% a year for 5 years, commencing later.
To place this in context, in a contemporary ruling, the Chief of Defence Procurement (a retired Vice Admiral), and later Ministers, upheld that it is a routine expectation of any project manager to make 33% savings on a project, while delivering early and to a better specification, and without affecting operational capability or effectiveness. Perhaps, instead of arbitrarily chopping the Defence budget, this could be put to the test and measured against projects that have achieved it?
The reason for H-C's deliberate error is clear. Had he reported the truth, he would not have been able to name and shame those that he did, especially General Sam Cowan and Air Chief Marshal Malcolm Pledger. Instead, he would have had to criticise those whom he praised, including the said Chief Engineer. At the time, the major headache for the RAF was Mull of Kintyre. The truth would immediately be recognised as exculpatory evidence in that case, as the effect of the policy could be seen in the mandate placed upon the Air Staff that the aircraft was not to be flown. (See Mull of Kintyre Review). The same names cropped up.
Hope this clarifies matters a little and adds a little context.