Originally Posted by
Just This Once...
C-130K fleet was widely fitted with counterfeit main undercarriage parts in the late-'90s. They were not even the same shape as the originals, let alone the same material. Sometime later the C-130K fleet was widely fitted with now broken or completely failed main undercarriages, usually taking the tracks with them. Emergency drills were also widely carried out, even after the counterfeit parts were discovered, as the fleet carried on flying with the bogus parts...
I don't doubt this in any way.
But I do have knowledge of what happened after AMSO took control of the entire support budget around 1990, allowing suppliers to self-delegate engineering decisions and technical/financial approvals.
Our Quality Assurance oversight of suppliers' Quality Control process (if they even had one) was largely ditched, as were our DGDQA staff. Companies would bid for a job (e.g. an undercarriage part) and be awarded the contract. Then they'd ask the supplier 'Can we have the drawings to see what we're meant to be making?'. At which point the supplier would topple, as they'd run down the contracts that supplied and maintained certified copies of drawings that were meant to be have been issued with the tender pack. Contract delayed, and front line forced to rob and grant concessions.
A common problem was the drawings would call up an expensive special process. Vacuum Cadmium plating was a common one, usually requiring specialised heat treatment, which in the 90s few companies had the wherewithal to do. (In fact, one MoD workshop had the largest facility in western Europe, earning a small fortune in repayment work). The company would do something cheap and quick like Dalic plate it, and sign it off. With no MoD QA rep in sight. Meeting fine tolerances was another issue. Irregular shapes not milled correctly. And so on. Not 'counterfeit' as such, but definitely not to spec and unfit for purpose. Unwitting 18-year old suppliers would simply accept this, and no subsequent investigation would even think of looking at their actions.
Meanwhile MoD's engineers tore their hair out. My extravagant centre-parting became worse at just this time.
JTO - Something you definitely wouldn't have seen was a Director Internal Audit report, completed in June 1996. It had been commissioned by the engineers who had been threatened with the sack for complaining about this new AMSO policy and practice. It was marked No Further Action, buried, and finally destroyed. But only the original and AMSO/AML copies. Those who commissioned it retained theirs. Still got mine. This was by no means a one-off. At the time DIA were inundated and had to be selective about which cases to investigate. To avoid an even greater workload, and embarrassment, cases of blatant fraud were often marked 'Admin error' and MoD would accept credit notes against the next contract. That there shouldn't have been a next contact was ignored.